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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to trace tariff relations
between the United States and Canada connecting them with
trade and financial affairs.

The period from 1900 to

1925 is dealt with more extensively and completely than the
earlier period.

In covering the period from 1926 to 1931,

periodical material was used.

This section was included

principally to bring the paper up to date.
Tariff relations are of economic and political im
portance in foreign relations and as affecting relations
with our northern neighbor are of particular interest.
Government documents and publications, books on trade
and tariffs, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs,
and periodical articles were used.

All material was obtain

ed at the Library of the University of Montana*

' -1—
Early Tariff Relations between the United States
and Canada
Relations between the United States and Canada are of
particxilar interest due to the social and political
similarity of the two countries#

Both speak the same lan

guage and have had a parallel economic development*
Canada has 20 per cent greater territory than the
United States but Bias less than 8 per cent as large a
population.

There are 2.24 inhabitants per square mile in

Canada, 29.85 in the United States.

Fifty-four per cent of

Canada's inhabitants are rural; 34.3 per cent of the people
gainfully employed are engaged In farming.

One fourth of

Canada's export Is wheat. *
The question of tariff relations between the United
States and Canada has been of importance since 1846.

From

1831 to 1843 wheat grown in the United States was permitted
to enter Canada free, resulting in the importation of
considerable quantities of American wheat to be ground Into
flour.

This flour was then admitted to England at the
2
colonial preferential duty.
In 1842, the Canadian duty of three shillings a quarter
w p s -levied

on grain from the United States.

% e hrltlsh

1. Reciprocity with Canada, a study of the arrangement of 1911
United States tariff Commission, {Washington, i>. C., 193b),
pp. 9 and 11. Figures given by the State Department In
• 1918.
2. Charles C. Tansill, The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854
Johns Hopkins University Studies, Series 46, 1 Baltimore,
1922), p. 13©

~2~
Government promised that all grain shipped, from Canada
would be admitted at one shilling instead of the existing
rate of from one to five shillings*

This favored the

Canadian canal system and milling Interests® ®
The potato famine in Ireland in 1845 caused Robert Peel
to oppose the corn"laws®

Great Britain changed her tariff

policy and lowered the colonial preference on grain until
1849 when it was to disapnear*
was also lowered*

The preference on timber

The Canadian depression of 1849 was

severe, particularly for the canal and milling interests,
and the new trade policy of the mother country was considered
4
partly responsible®
May 12, 1845, the Canadian House of assembly agreed to
an address to the Queen requesting her to begin negotiations
for a reciprocal arrangement between Canada and the United
States®

The British Government promised aid® 5

In 1848, Hamilton ^errltt was sent from Canada to the
6
United State© to urge a reciprocity measure.
Due to his
effort, the Grinnell Bill providing for the free admittance
into the United States of certain articles from Canada In
return for reciprocal action by the Canadian Government was
Introduced and was before ^ongress at various times from
Hay 4, 1848, until January 23, 1849, when for the second time
3. Tansill, op* cit®, p® 13.
4® Ibid., p. 30®

-So

it failed t© pass the Senate. 7

There was no general inter©

eat in Canadian reciprocity in the United States.
The British Parliament, in August, 1846, gave Canada the
right to repeal existing duties upon imports from foreign,
countries.

As a result, the Canadian Parliament, by an act

of July 28, 1847, lowered duties on American manufactures
from 12§ per cent to

per cent and the duty on British
i
i
8
manufactures was raised from 5f per cent to 7f* per cent.
This was a Canadian step toward reciprocity.
Canada passed on act on April 25, 1849, admitting free
certain raw materials whenever similar articles were admitted
free to the United States. 9

The economic situation in

Canada was serious; prosperity built on colonial preference
had collapsed.

It seemed necessary to open the American

market.
There was some talk In Canada of annexation to the
United States.

The business Interests wanted access to

the United States Markets.

Reciprocity with the United

States was mentioned in Lord Elgin’s earliest speech to the
Canadian parliament.

He sow that the desire for annexation

was commercial, not political, and could best be met by
commercial reciprocity.
7. Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1 st. sees., pp. 723 and
,

9*23

«

'

'

7

" "

.

Ibid., 30th Gong., 2nd Seas., pp. 46, 62, 182-186, 327.
Tansill, op. cit., pp. 20-23.
8. Tansill, o p / 'clt., p. 23.
9. Ibid., p • 24*
10. Canada and its Provinces, ed. by Adam Shortt. (23 v..
foronibor W S - m ? ) , TT7 p. 75.
Lord Elgin became Governor-General of Canada in 1847.

-4A M i l providing for the admittance of certain
Canadian articles free of duty on condition that these same
articles be admitted Into Canada free was reported to the
United States House of Representatives- on January 29, 1850*

31

ft was complicated by the -question of .American rights to
navigate the St.- Lawrence.
acted upon.

The bill was discussed but not

Francis Hlncks was sent to Washington in 1851

as a Canadian commissioner to urge -an agreement.

In spite

of his efforts, the Thirty-First Congress took no action.
Lord Elgin, Governor-Seneral of Canada, sent a note
on June 7, 1851, to Sir. Henry Sulwer, British representative
of the negotiations at Washington,, saying that Canadian
retaliation was likely.

Several means were suggested;

closing Canadian canals to Americans, a twenty per cent duty
on imports from the United States into Canada, the -enactment
of differential duties to draw trade to Quebec and Montreal,
and an appeal-to- England for duties there against the United
States.
President Fillmore brought the question of commercial
relations with Canada to the attention of Congress in hi®

11. Tansill, op. ci t., p » 52.
12. Cong. CloBee ST""st. Cong., 2nd sees., pp. 203, 293-6.
TansilIT "op", clt.. pp. 36-7.
13., Tansill, op. eft., pp. 38-39.-

annual massage of December 2, 1351, but again Congress did
nothing. 14
At this time, the question of the rights of American
fishing interests in British North American waters was still
unsettled.

Some Canadians hoped to use It as a means of

gaining more favorable trade relations with the United States.
In 1852, Great Britain sent ships to aid Canada in the
protection of her coasts and rights,

A clash between fishers

of the United States and the British naval forces seemed
probable.
President Fillmore in his t M r d annual message delivered
on December 6, 1852, called attention to the questions of
fishing rights and reciprocity.

Bills in the House and

In the Senate failed in February, 1855.
particular interest in the question.

There was no

Settlement was post

poned u'-til after President Pierce took office when the
14. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, ed. by
trames Do Richardson, thabKlngtoh, D. C*, '1897), V,,
pp. 118-119o **Your attention la again invited to the
question of reciprocal trad© between the United States
and Canada and other British possesssions near our frontier.
Overtures for a convention upon this subject have been
received from Her Britainic Majesty*a minister plenipoten
tiary, but It seems to be in many respects preferable that
the matter should be regulated by reciprocal legislation. ,
Documents are laid before you showing the terms which the
British Government
is willing to offerandthemeasures
which it may adopt
if some arrangementupon this subject
shall not be made,°
15. Tansill, oj>. cit.,
p. 43.
16. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 163-S64.
17. Cong, Globe,"52niO?ong.» 2nd sees., pp. 582, 514. 953,

1KI-9S¥7W?.

H. Bill.360 and S. Bill 609, 32 nd Gong., 2nd Sees.
, Tansill, oj) cit., pp. 49-50.

whole affair passed out of the hands of Congress and was
taken over by the new Secretary of State, William L. Ilarcyo

18

Banger of a collision of fishing and naval forces in
the St. Lawrence region again threatened.

John S. Crampton,

British minister at Washington, and Marcy took the question
of the relations of the United States and Canada under
consideration. There was serious discussion concerning coal
on the free list and the registering of British made ships
bought by Americans, but both were left out of the project
treaty of September 1, 1853. 19
The British Government did not immediately act on the
project treaty.

The United States sent Israel D. Andrews to

Canada as a special agent with a liberal allowance to work
for the treaty. A settlement was necessary to harmonious
British-Amer1can' relations.
In Upy, 1854, Lord Elgin, a proponent of the treaty
project, was sent to the United States as a Special
Commissioner.

There he used his diplomacy to get Democratic

backing for the bill.

The South feared an annexation

movement if concessions were not granted to Canada, and
therefore favored the measure.

Due to Lord Elgin’s efforts,

the Elgln-Marey Treaty was signed on June 6, 1854, and was
approved by the Senate on August 2nd by a vote of 32 to 11.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Tansill, op. cit., p. 51.
Ibid.,
pp. 54-62, 82-86.
Ibid.,
pp.66-78.
Ibid.,
pp. 87-93. Gives treaty in full.
Heelrooctty with Canadaa„_pp» 22-23. Abstract of treaty
with complete free.list:.
See Appendix, p. I.

01

Between September 23 and Becomber 13, 1854, the Ca
nadian provinces considered and passed 'the legislation nec
essary to gi ve the treaty force*

Accordingly, it was put

into effect on March 16, 1855, by a proclamation of Prosi- 1

22
dent Fierce on that date.

In July, 1855, Newfoundland

passed the necessary legislation and the

treaty was ex23
tended to that territory on December 12, 1855.
The treaty as finally

adopted settled the immediate

causes of friction between

the two countries.

Article I

concerned American fishing

rights in waters of British

North America; Article II,

British

fishing rights in

American waters; Article III contained a reciprocal free
list; Article IV gave citizens of the United States the
right to navigate the St. Lawrence.

Canals were to be

open on the same basis to citizens of both countries un
til further notice by Great Britian.

British citizens

were to have free use of Lake Michigan.

There was to be

no export duty on lumber

cut in Maine, shipped to Now

Brunswick, and then back

to the United States.

provided that the treaty

should go into effect as soon as

necessary laws were passed.

It

Article V

was to last for ten years

but could be abrogated on one year*s notice.

By Article

VI, Newfoundland was considered seperate, and Article VII
required that the treaty be ratified within six months
after signing.

22. Richardson, op. cit., ¥., pp. 325-6.
23. Tansill, op. cit., p. 80.

-8 -

The canal provisions were the first to he violated*
A few years after the signing of the treaty Canada adopted
a diagulsed discrimination by granting a rebate to vessels
continuing through to the ocean on the Canadian routes*
Irritation over this violation was one of the causes for
24
the eventual abrogation of the treaty by the United States*
Canada* in 18€0, was in serious need of revenue and
the tariff was raised on manufactured goods.

There had

been no reciprocity on manufactured goods due to American
fear of British goods entering the United States through
Canada.

Canada had, however, been pursuing a liberal com

mercial policy toward the United States, and the raised
tariff was considered a violation of the spirit of the
treaty.

Ad valorum duties were levied on the value of

goods from place of last shipment, diverting European
25
shipping from New York to Montreal.
Protests were made
by the legislature of New York "with requests for the en~
26
1argument of total abrogation of the treaty.”
Abrogat
ion was favored by the coal, fish, and lumber interests.
During the Civil War period the United States was
hostile toward Great Britain because of the "Alabama in24. Reciprocity with Canada, p.23.
25. Ooodsr‘'sH?|jpe^’from "Europe to lew York increased in
value due to the expense of shipment. When the value
of the goods was taken as that of the last place of
shipment, goods from European ports shipped direct had
the advantage.
26. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 24.

cident," and other evidences of Confederate sympathy#
An armed raid upon Vermont was made in December, 2864,
from Canada by Confederate sympathiziers, and a wave of
28
hostility swept over the United States*
Demands were
made for abrogation of the treaty and It^was terminated
by the United States on March# 17,, 1866*
Several quotations will serve to show the effect of
the treaty and its abrogation*
Exports of domestic merchandise to British
North American increased, both absolutely and re
latively to total trade, during the continuance
of the treaty, and decreased again when the treaty
was abrogated. The growth, although steady and
marked, was not strikingly great, and the treaty
was merely one among many other influences oper
ating both to increase and decrease the volume of
trade.
From an average of 3 percent of our total annual
imports in the six years before the treaty, Imports
from British North America increased to over 8 per
cent while the treaty was in force and declined to
7 percent thereafter* Reciprocity articles formed
about 90 percent of this trade during the treaty
period, although they had amounted to only a little
over two-thirds before that time.
50
The chief direct result of abrogation in the
United. States, appears, therefore, to have been on
the one hand, to burden the American consumer with
duties, as in the case of barley and pine lumber,
and on the other to divert from American railways and
27. During the Civil War, the British government had not
prevented the building of the Confederate ship "Alabama"
in Liverpool nor prex^ented its sailing from England to
engage in hostilities against the United States.
28. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 27.
29. Bec'lpro'c'f^y'ancf'Co^ercial Treatles. p. 74.
50. Be^prootr£y
p T l ^ T ~ nQn page 26 is given an
.e'xtenslve table of" Merchandisc imports into the United
States from British North America*

-10merchants the business of transportings handling and re
exporting Canadian produce. 31.
Abrogation of the treaty led to concern in Canada.

There

were matters of dispute in regard to fishing regulations that
might lead to friction between the two countries.
the Dominion of Canada was created.

In 1867s

One author considers

this a direct result of abrogation.
There is no doubt that the establishing of
Canadian union in 1867 was due primarily to the action
of the American Government on the matter of reciprocity,
and the hostility which the people of the United States
so clearly exhibited. 32.
1866-1890
Though the United States refused to consider a renewal
of the treaty, reciprocity remained on the program of both
political parties in Canada until 1896.

In 1869 the United

States gave Canadian proposals no serious consideration, and
In 1870, Canada placed duties on coal, salt, grain, flour,
and hops.

These duties were repealed the following year

when it appeared they would have no Influence on the American
poliey.

In spite of the rejection of Canadian proposals

there was considerable feeling In favor of reciprocity In
the United States.
In 1870, Great Britain and the United States agreed to
discuss the fishing rights controversy and the Alabama claims
question.

Canada was willing to make concessions in regard
........

fe

_

____________

31. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, United States Tariff
Commission, {Washington, D. C., 1919), p. 89.
32. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
33. Ibid., p. 93.

_____ _______

-11to fisheries In return for limited reciprocity.

Hie Ameri

cans preferred to pay a money equivalent.
Hie Americans rejected a British Proposal for full
reciprocity in return for the use of the fisheries. An
American offer of one million dollars for the fisheries
in perpetuity, and a British proposition for free fish,
salt, lumber, coal and reciprocity in the coasting trade
were also rejected. The British commissioners next
proposed to concede the right to fish Inshore for a
term of years In exchange for the admission of coal,
salt, lumber and fish into the United States. Against
this Macdonald formally protested. 34.
The Treaty of Washington, as signed May 8, 1871, pro
vided that the Alabama claims question be left to the
Board of Arbitration at Geneva and that the San Juan Islands
dispute be referred to the German Emperor.

Canadian coastal

fisheries were to be open to Americans for ten years,
compensation to Canada to be arranged by a Commission.
was later fixed by arbitration at $5,500,000.

This

Americans

were to have free navigation of the St. Lawrence River and
the Great hakes and St. Lawrence canals, and Canadians were
to have the right of free navigation on Lake Michigan and on
certain rivers flowing into the Pacific.

Canadians were to

have the right to transfer goods In bond through the United
States, Americans through Canada. 35
The treaty was accepted in Canada but was not popular.
Canadians thought England had not given their interests
due consideration.
34. Canada and its Provinces, VI., p. 49. Sir John A. Macdonald
was the first Prime ifinister of Canada and a leader of the
conservative party.
35. Ibid., p. 50.

-12The treaty was a bitter disappointment to Canada *
where it was felt that England* in disposing of the
fisheries and waterways controversies* had thrown away
the most effective lever for opening the American market.
Macdonald had strenuously opposed It* but he had been
voted down by the other British commissioners»
36
In 1874* the Liberals* who favored better trade relations
with the United States* came into power.

Reciprocity was

again under consideration In connection with determining
the money compensation provided for In the Treaty of Washing
ton... March 17* 1874* a commission was appointed.

George

Brown.of Canada and Sir. Edward Thornton* British minister
at Washington* were to negotiate a treaty of fisheries* com
merce, and navigation with the United States.

A Tariff

Commission publication describes the treaty and its reception
thus:
The Canadian commissioners and the Department of State
finally concluded a draft of a treaty wherein the free
list not only contained the articles which had appeared
in the Treaty of 1854, but also* in addition, agricul
tural implements, boots* shoes* furniture, manufnctures
of cotton, iron, steel* leather, and wool. But there
was included a provision whereby everything made free to
r,the United States was also to be made free to Great
Britain; therefore when President Grant sent the draft
of the treaty to the Senate and asked for advice, It
was returned with the opinion that it was inexpedient
to proceed with the matter.
37*
John Lewis says:
President Grant sent the treaty to the Senate with a
half hearted and non-committal message. It reached
the Senate only two days before adjournment* and was
returned to the president with the advice that it was
inexpedient to proceed with its consideration. 38
38. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties* p. 94,
37. I b i d . * p . 95.
!
: ~
Richardson* op. Cit.* pp. 266-267.
38. Canada and its Provinces* VI.* p 68.

-13The question of trade relations with Canada was closed for
the time being.

The Can dlan Manufacturers1 Association and

the Dominion Boa^d of Trade were against the agreement*
The Conservative Party crme into power in 1878 on the
tariff issue.

"Reciprocity of trade or reciprocity of

tariffs" was their motto. ^

The tariff of the Budget of

1879 was according to the "National Policy" of protection t©
Canadian industry.
from the free list.
per cent.

Coal, flour, and nig iron were removed
Duties were placed at from 20 to 100

The average rate in 1867 had been 15 per cent and

in 1874 was 17^ per cent* ^

The budget also contained an
41
offer of reciprocity in natural products.
The depression
from 1884 to 1890 encouraged the Liberal agitation for
reciprocity.
The settlement of the fisheries question had not been
satisfactory to American fishermen.

In 1883, the United

Stages gave the necessary notice and on July 1, 1885, the
fisheries clauses of the Treaty of Washington were formally
4p
abrogated.
Friction resulted in the passage by the
United SJates of a non-intercourse act.

This act, approved

ftfarch 3, 1887, provided that the President, whenever he was
satisfied that the American fisheries or fishermen were being
unjustly vexed or harrassed in Canadian waters, could deny
39.
40*
41.
42.

Reclproclty_and Commercial Treatles, p. 95.
Canada and Its Rrovl rices»" Vr.,' p. 68.
iSid.Y p. 87.----------Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 97.

“14to Canadian vessels entrance to American ports and could
prohibit the entry of any Dominion products*

The act was

never put into force#
The Bayard-Chambe rla in Treaty was signed February 17*
1888* but, after a long debate in the Senate* failed.

By

this treaty the United States Government was to recommend to
Congress the p ssage of the necessary legislation to remove
the duties on the fisheries products of Canada and Newfound* '

land.

44

A temporary settlement of the fisheries question

was, arranged and extended from year to year.
1890-1900
During the early part of the decade from 1890 to 1900#
public opinion in the United States and in Canada was more
favorable toward reciprocity.
’’unrestricted reciprocity;**

In 1891 the Liberals wanted
the Conservatives emphasized

imperial ties* but were not against reciprocity.

Hie latter

announced that negotiations with the United States were in
progress. In the elections of March 5* 1891* the Conservatives
lost ground.

Immediately afterwards* annexation by the United

States was used by the Conservatives as an argument against
reciprocity, and in the by-elections following the general
election* they gained votes. 45
45* Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties* p. 97*
Senate Bill 3173, 49th Cong.* 2nd sees.
House Report 10241, 49th Cong*, 2nd sees*
44, Hcciprocity and Commercial Treaties. p. 359#
45* Canada and its Provinces* VI., pp. 113-115.

The

United Crates Secretery of State, James 9. Blaine,

in discussions on Canadian reciprocity in 1892, insisted on
some manufactured articles 'being included in any tariff
agreement and also that (treat- Britain be excluded from the
advantages of such an arrangement, so the question was dropped
The Liberal -nrty in 1895 abendoned advocacy of "un
restricted reclnroc'ty” , but re-mined in sup ort of Mliberal
reel roc't.y,” or limited reciprocity arranged by treaty.
--Ithough the Liberal victory in 1896 was largely a
of Personalities, tariff wns an issue.

mat ter

Carl TIttke says:

The Tariff was the second
jor issue of the
campaign of 1896, and Laurier decided to tackle this
coiaollcated nroblew by means of a tariff commission
which would conduct public hearings in many parts of
the country in an effort to determine scientifically
the tariff needs of each specific industry. It soon
became apparent that, whatever may have been the
Liberal promises of lower tariff rates during the
campaign, the oarty did not intend to make radical
changes in the orelective system now that it w s charged
with the responsibilities or government• The recent
enactment of the Dingley tariff by tho United States,
the highest since the Civil War. undoubtedly had its
effect "In convincing Canada that the time for free
trade had net yet nr-ived. 47.
The McKinley Tarif f of 1890 raised the average United
States rate from 38 ter cert to 49.5 per cent.

Tariff was

a minor issue in the campaign of 1896 and McKinley called
a special session of Congress in March, 1897, to revise
46. Hugh Eennleyslde, Ca -«da and the United. States* {New
fork, 1929), ;>p.
”
47, Carl wihtke, A History of Canada, (New York, 1927),
p. 245

raising the are rrre to 67 per cent. 48

It contained a

provision for increasing inport duties upon lumber by an
amount equal to the ex;ort duty which Canada imposed on
logs.

This threat cause ■ the Dominion Government to re

move the export duti s.

The resulting advantages were short

lived due to the action cf the Provincial Governments•
In 1900 the

'rovi.ecc of OntarloV and Infer, British Columbia,

Cuebec, s- d '(cw Brunswick enacted laws requiring that timber
49
cut on crown lands should be manufactured in Canada.
Trade between Can he.
in spite of high tariffs.

d the United States increased
Such increase was probably much

less than it would have been had there been no trade
barrier.
Canada became more protectionist.

W. S. Fielding,

Minister of Finance, was against reduction of custom duties.
In his budget speech delivered on £prll 23,. 1897, Fielding
said that tariff changes must be made with cnution and with
consideration for oristing interests, but that, while he
would not meet the Dingley Bill in a retaliatory srlrit, he
thourht Canada "should hold her hand for the present.”
48. Frank v il 11 am Taussig, The tariff history of the United
States, 6th edition, (hew York, 1 9 1 4 pp. '251-36T
49. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 365.
50. T^nnda"'^''^ fts ProvlncesV'Vf., p. 132.

-17Concernlng the Cana dlan tariff, a Tariff Commission
publication says:
It is true that the Canadian duties were usually not
so high as American, but according to the evidence of
the debate in the House of Commons, they were arranged
so as to discriminate as far as possible against
American imports.
51
The following summary gives the provisions of the Canadian
Tariff Act of 1897.
1. Revision and consolidation of various acts on tariff.
2. Nothin*g in the act was to effect the French Treaty
of 1894. Any country granting Canada favorable terms
was to receive Schedule D. >If the price of any article
was unduly high because of a trust, the article was to
be placed on the free list.
5. Cancellation of all orders contrary to the act.
4. Act to brve effect April 23, 1897.
5. The Governor in Council night grant bounties on
certain iron and steel products manufactured for con
sumption in Canada.
9. Schedule A. was of dutiable goods; B. war a free list;
C, was a list of prohibited goods; and P. a provision for
reel rocal t riff.
52
By Schedule D, British preference from April, 1897, to June
30, 1898, was to :e n one eighth reduction from the general
schedule,

after t e letter date, the reduction was to be

one fourth.

Reductions wore not to apoly to liquors, sugar
53
or sugar products, tobacco or tobacco products.
54
The tariff was modified i.n 1898. "
The date of chang
ing to the one fourth reduction on British preference was
51. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 365.
52. Senate Socurnent^ ;o. 66, 55th X'ong., 1st sess., Serial
3562. Act given in full.
53. Loc. cit.
54. Bouse documents, Ho. 565, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Cons.
Rept., No. 217, Serial 3676, pp. 2.46-248.

-18®
extended to August 1, 1898.

Schedule

according to the

ammendment, provided for a British preferential tariff
with a reduction of twenty-five per.cent of the ordinary
rates to be granted to the genuine products of the United
Kingdom* Bermuda* the British West Indies, British Guiana,
and other British possessions granting Canada preferential
treatment.

For other countries giving preferential tariff

treatment to Canada, the reduction of one fourth remained.
After British preference had been in force for four
months, the Toronto ,fMall and Empire” for November 24, 1898,
said:
The statement is made unofficially, in explanation of
this snowing, that the disposition to avail of the
benefits of the preferential cut if off set by a
tendency on the part of Canadian Importers to await
the outcome of the present reciprocity negotiations
at Washington before transferring orders from the
United States to British houses. As for the failure
of the preferential tariff to encourage the import
ation or British as against United States iron and
steel, it Is candidly enough admitted that even with
the 25 per cent advantage, it would be impossible
for British manufacturers to compete with Americans
In Canadian markets. 55.
Thus at the opening of the Twentieth Century both
Canada and the United States had highly protective tariffs.
Canada had adopted her tariff policy only after repeated
efforts to interest the United States in a liberal com
mercial agreement.

55. Souse Document, Bo 73, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., Cons
Kept,, Bo, 222, Serial 3782, p. 380o

.

Relations Paring; The First Decade off the
Twentieth Century
British Preference
The twentieth century opened with high tariffs in both

the United States and Canada and with British Preference a
principle of Canadian policy*
Preference was discussed in Canada during the early years
of the Century.

The two main objects in establishing it had

been (1) to divert Canadian trade from the United States as
a protest against the Dingley tariff and (2) to cultivate
1
closed relations with the mother country. On July 1, 1900
the preference was increased from twenty-five to thirty2
three and one third percent of the general schedule*
Imports from both the United States and from Great
Britain and increased from 1897 to 1899, the gain for the
United States being 031,557,959 and for Great Britain
3
. IB ,234,812.
However, before British preference had been
inaugurated, British Imports had been decreasing*
Uhlle a further Increase in the preference was expect
ed to aid British trade, it probably would only slightly
check trade with the United States since Great Britain and
1. House Documents, 49, Consular Repts. No. 343, Serial
3946, pp. 524-5
2. House Documents, 49, Cons. Repts. No. 237, Serial 3945,
pp. 247-8.
3. Ibid, pp. 247-8.
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the United States did not compete in any branches of
4
Canadian trade.
The Canadian loss in tariff on British
5
goods in 1898 was approximately 12,000.000.
Figures quoted from a reoort of the Canadian Minister
of Trade and Commerce for 1901 are of interest in showing
the rates on goods imported from the United States and from
Great Britain both before and after preferential treatment
was granted.
Average ad valoreum rate of duty on dutiable goods
from
G. B.
U. S.

1897

1901

Average rate on total imports
G.B
U.S

18:322$
12:424$

21:106$
14:287$

6
Canadian attitude toward preference varies with the
Interests of the people concerned.

The Canadian woolen

Industry felt the tariff most and the price of woolen fabrics
had decrease ! as a result of Preference.

Harlan M. Brush,

United States Consul at Niagara Fat Is, said:
As the ‘reports from the United States last year
of wool and manufacturers were only $953,087 against
$8,381,147 from Great Britain, it is evident that
Canadian manufacturers do not see the particular ad4. See above, p. 18.
5. House Documents, 48, Cons. Kept. No. 237, Serial 3945,
pp. 247-8.
6. Canadian Annual Review, of Public Affairs, 1910, J.
Caste'!.'! itoplfTns',"' editor. (Toronto, 1902) p. 124.

-21nantage in being fenced into stronger competition with
Great Britain* ¥
The Canadian Manufacturers *

Association declared in 1903

in favor of a revision of tariffs to protect manufacturing
Interests and for preference to the mother country* ®
On March 15, 1901, the Legislature of New Brunswich
passed the following resolution unanimously*
That it is the opinion of this House that the
Province of New Brunswick will be materially benefited
in a commercial sense if the present Dominion Tariff
Law be so amended that the Preferential clause now apply
ing to British goods imported into Canada shall apply
only when such imports are made directly through
Canadian ports* 9
The Toronto Board of Trade was not in favor of such a measure.
Forcing freight through irregular channels would result in
additional time and expense and might be considered as un
friendly legislation by the United States*
10
taken by the Dominion Government *

No action was

Canada’s preferential legislation led to discussion
both in Canada and in Great Britain as to whether the
mother country should give similar advantages by imposing
duties on the products of countries outside of the British
Empire*

Canadian trade with the United States was in

creasing more rapidly than that with Great Britain. The
British Government, however, was against any change of
7. House Documents, 49, Cons* Repts., No. 243, Serial 3946,
pp. 524-5.
8. Canadian Annual Review,1903, p. 386.
9. Ibxd.*, 1901,' p." 12&»
10. Ibid., 1901, p. 126o
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Although Preference had not proved of great com

mercial value, It had created good will toward Canada tn
Great Britain*
British Preference, claimed the Canadian manufacturer,
increased the competition of the Canadian and British manu
facturers and the Americans were cutting prices to meet such
competition*

The Conservative press and speakers tried to

prove that Preference was both useless to the motherland and
11
injurious to Canadian industries*
Preference, some
claimed, had been annuled by the raising of duties before
the change was raadd.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity was discussed from time to time in both
the United States and Canada.

W* P. Maclean spoke in the

Canadian House of Commons to the effect that Canada was the
best market of the United States and advised reciprocal tariff
12
action.
The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir. Wilfrid Laurier,
speaking at a banquet of the Canadian Manufacturers9 Associ
ation at Montreal on November 6, 1901, said:
In the past we have sent delegations from Canada to
Washington to ask them to give us Reciprocity treaties;
we are not sending more delegations there. I should not
11. Canadian Annual Review. 1902, p. 124. A preference that
was" useless to the mother “‘country would not Increase
competition.
12. Ibid., 1901, pp. 167-168.
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fee surprised no!*/ to see us receive at Ottawa delegations
from Washington asking us in our turn for Reciprocity
treaties, and we shall receive them, In the way Washing
ton has taught us to act, with every possible politeness*.
13
On February 24, 1902, John Charlton, a member of the
Canadian House of Commons, Introduced the following motions
That this House Is of the opinion that the Canadim
Import duties should fee arranged upon the principle of
reciprocity in trade conditions as far as may fee consist
ent with Canadian interests; that a rebate of not less
than 40 per cent of the amount of duties Imposed should
fee made upon dutiable Imports from nations or countries
admitting Canadian natural products into their markets
free of duty, and that the scale of Canadian duties
should fee sufficiently high to avoid Inflicting injury
upon Canadian Interests in cases where a rebate of 40
per cent or more shall fee made under the conditions
aforea&Id. 14*
Such an arrangement would merely fee a means of bargaining
with other countries for trade advantages.

Mr. Charlton

also favored a high tariff against the United States*
In 1903 there was no general discussion of reciprocity.
The United States was In temporary need of coal because of
the Antheraclte Coal Strike of May to October, 1902, and
in January, 1903, a measure passed the Congress of the United
States providing for a rebate of duties on coal for one year.
There was some discussion in Canada whether or not to
reciprocate but no change in the Canadian Tariff was made.
13. Canadian Annual Review, 1901, p. 170.
14, ihid^
1pV i8bo
■

George B. Foster, a member of Parliament, made the
following statement on December, 1904#
There is a growing indisposition to set the
currents of trade by hard and fast treaties lasting
for definite periods and then subject to denunciation
by a power which has different national aims and
ambitions. The hold thus given to the more powerful
participator, the confusion possible fnom an abrupt
closing of the gates, and the consequent necessity for
opening new avenues of trade at great trouble and
expense create a situation frought with menace and
peril. A Reciprocity which would tend to make us
depend on the United States for our manufactured goods,
to draw off our great natural products to be finished
there, to starve our great lines of railway and our
ocean ports, has no powerful claim upon a young, vigor
ous , and hopeful race of nation builders. 15
Cyrus A. Birge, ex-president of the Canadian Manufacturers*
Association said.of reciprocity:
We have little cr nothing to gain by it and much
to lone. Our fanners don’t want it as it would not
advance their interests. Our merchants don’t want It
for it would not increase their profits. Otar artisans
and mechanics don’t want it as it would lessen their
wages and le ve them with less employment. Our
manufacturers don’t want it as it would open their
market for your surplus products and decrease their
output« We have enough of this as it is. 16.
The Canadian farmers and agricultural associations,
on the other hand, were In favor of better tradd relations
with the United States.

They would gain a market for their

surplus products and would have reduced living expenses due
to lower prices on manufactured products. -

15. Canadian Annual Review, 1904, p. 456
16. lbfd7rip r ’¥5¥o
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In the United States there was occasional discussion of
reciprocity*

At the meeting of the Merchants’ Association

of Hew York in 1901 a resolution was passed in favor of
this policy.

In a speech at Buffalo on September 5> 1901,

President McKinley said* ”A policy of gjood will and friendly
trade relations will prevent reprisals.

Reciprocity treaties

are in harmony with the spirit of the times, measures of
retaliation are not.”

^

At the convention of the National Reciprocity league
of the United States in Detroit In December, 1902, John
Charlton, a member of the Canadian Parliament, said that
Canada had ceased to take the initiative.

A resolution

was passed to urge upon Congress the necessity of favorable
commercial relations with Canada.

The Furniture Associ

ation of America at Its annual convention in 1905 declared
in favor of reciprocity.

In January of the same year, the

National Board of Trade at Washington, D. C., passed the
following resolution:
Resolved, that the National Board of Trade re
spectfully petitions the President and the Congress of
the United States and the American members of the
Anglo-American Joint High Commission, to do all that
lies in their respective powers to secure a trade
treaty between the two countries upon the broad busi
ness principles of reciprocal concessions.
Resolved, that as a step in this direction the National
Board of Trade favors the measure now before the United
17. Canadian Annual Review, 1901, p. 169.
18. Ibid., I9O2, p. 1&3. Seel ahove, p. 23.

—

26*1*

States authorizing the President- to remove the duties
on Canadian coal, in return for a similar action by the
Dominion of Canada with regard to coal from the United
States* 19*
The Republican platform of 1904 favored

commercial

reciprocity, whenever reciprocal arrangements can be effected
consistent with the principles of protection without injury
n SDO
to American agriculture, labour, or any American industry.
The Democratic platform mentioned Canada in particular. ttWe
favour liberal trade araangements with Canada, and with
peoples of other countries, where they can be entered into
with benefit to American agriculture, manufacturing, mining,
« 21
or commerce.”
The Democratic text book for 1904 gives
the following interesting comparison of duties*
U. S.

Canadian

Pood and animals
Crude articles
Manufactured articles
for use as materials
Manufactured articles
Luxuries

72.80
27.85

26t?98
22.48

25.65
49.22
57.47

19.78
24.30
55.56

Average rate

49.03

27.13

The platform of the Massachusetts Demouratie Convention
of 1907, made the statement;
19. Canadian Annual Review, 1905, p. 384.
20. Platforms of the two great political parties, 1856-1928,
inclusive,' ed/ by William 'Tyler Page. '(Washington. D. 2.,
1928), P. 135.
21. Ibid., p. 129.
22. Canadian Annual Review, 1904, p. 451.

-27”.'e deimnd, in particular, free and unrestricted
trade vrith Canada, that the people of Hen England nay
enjoy the natural advantages of their geographical
position and we believe that our northern neighbors,,
if properly approached, will still be found trilling
to meet us half tray in negotiating mutually beneficial
commercial agreements ®
23
At various times there mas reference in the United
States to annexation, but it vms not considered seriously
by the people of either country®
,

*

i

Canadian Tariff

* ..

Changes' in the Canadian tariff may be effected any year
by a change present'd with the budget, end, under the system
of ministerial responsibility, the measure comes into effect
immediatelyp to be accepted or rejected by Parliament®
Changes may also be made by an Order in Council®

In 1902

various industries, including the Portland Cement Company
and the boot and shoe Industry, made appeals for protection,
but no changes were made® 24
By an Order in Council on February 18, 1902, certain
articles entering into manufacturing were to be admitted
*

free®

These were help-bleaching compounds for manufacturing

rope, silver tubing for silverware, steel for cutlery,
yarn and.flax for towels, steel castings for scissors, parts
of cream separators and articles used In the manufacturing
23® Canadian Annual Review® 1908, p. 405®
24* house ^curaents', e¥, bon® Bepts*, Ho* 262, Serial 4334,
pp« 525-27*

25
of machinery.

-28As the price of newsprint was being

kept up fey a combination of paper manufacturers* the duty
26
was reduced from 25 per cent to 15 per cent on all paper.
By the anti-dumping provision adopted in 1904,, goods
sold at less than market value were subject to a further
duty of on© half of the regular duty.

A feu other amend
s'?
ments regarding certain articles were adopted also.
By the Canadian tariff law* going into effect November
31* 1906* but passing Parliament early in 1907* three
separate schedules were arranged instead of set percentage
reductions.

The new General Tariff had about the same rates

as the old.

Hie Intermediate Schedule was about ten per

cent under the General Tariff.
gaining purposes.

It was to be used for bar

British preferential rates were lowered

and were separated from the General Schedule.. The free list
was somewhat restricted.
Bounties were placed on ironand steel made
Canadian ore.
retaliation.

Hie sur-tax provision

from

of 1903 was retained for

The Governor In Council was given authority

to extend or withdraw the benefit
rates or the Intermediate Tariff.

ofthe British preferential
A 99 prr cent drawback

25. House Documents* 67* Cons. Repts., No. 260* Serial 4334*
p p • 65—66.
X** House Documents* 54, Cons. Repts., Ho. 286, Serial 4680*
* pp. 47-50.
26. Lo c £ Git*

-29was granted on coal when imported to be made Into coke for
28
smelting purposes.
J. H. Worman, the United States Consul at Three
Rivers, Quebec, wrote in ^ay, 1907, that
The high tariff wall proves no barrier to the
importation of American Goods. In most lines of goods
Americans can still compete successfully. First,
because of the close proximity and consequent small
expenditure for transportation. Second, because of the
promptness with which demands can be met. Third,
because of the l^rge facilities for manufacturing for
which our country is notable. 29
The public soemr.d fairly well satisfied with the
tariff.

M. S. Schell, Liberal member of Parliament, sum

med up the situation in the House of Commons on March 31,
1908;
It was a tariff in the first place to foster and
develop our own Industries, protecting them in a
legitimate way from undue foreigh competition; In the
second place it was a tariff which did not unduely
hamper trade or bring about an inflation of prices,
thus Imposing unjust burdens on the great producing
classes of our community; It was a tariff in the third
place designed to obtain the maximum of duties on im
ports to our country; and In the fourth place, it was
a tariff calculated to encourage trade with those
countries willing to trade with us on a reciprocal
basis. That was the kind of tariff which the Liberal
Government brought down In 1897 and which, with slight
changes, has b en in operation e^er s5nce. 30
28. Reciprocity and Commercial treaties, p. 864.
House Documents, 73, ftons. Repts. «os. 317 and 319.
pp. 132-6 and 182-5.
29. Canadian Annual Review, 1907, p. 301.
30. Canadian Annual Heview, 19(55*, p. 81.

The Canadian Minister of Finance, W, S. Fielding, in his
budget speech of 1909 said that stability of tariffs was
better for business.
By a convention with France signed In September, 1907,
and which went into effect in February, 1910, Canada ac
quired the rates of the French minimum tariff upon several
hundred items in return for her intermediate tariff and
for still lower rates on a few items.

The results were

insignificant but it called world attention to the Inter31
mediate Tariff.
The United States Tariff
In the United States the Dingley Tariff was In force
32
until 1909.
The Secretary of the United States Treasury, L. U.
Shaw, decided In 1905 that the United States millers could
import Canadian wheat to mix with domestic wheat and then
get a drawback when the flour was exported.

Attorney-

General , Moody, supported the Treasurer's decision and a
99 per cent drawback went into force.

The American wheat

farmer was opposed to the increased competition resulting
from the importation of Canadian wheat.

Some persons In

Canada, interested in milling, favored an export duty on
31. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 364.
32. See above, p.

33

such wheat,, but there was no government action*.
President Roosevelt, In his congressional message on
34
December 3, 1907,
cited the need for tariff'revision,
and the Republican National Convention in June, 1908,
brought up the tariff question.

Their platform said:

The Republican Party declares unequivocally for
the revision of the tariff by a special session of
Congress immediately following the inauguration of
the next President «... In all tariff legislation the
true principle of protection is best maintained by
the Imposition of such duties as will equal the dif
ference between the cost of production at home and
abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American ,
industries* 35
The party also favored the principle of a maximum and a
minimum tariff.

The Democrats favored a general downward
36
revision of tariff.

33.
34*
35.
36.

Canadian Annual Review, 1905, p. 524.
Corig. Record,
par^ T» $$th Cong, 1st sess, p. 71.
Platforms of the two great political parties, p. 157.
platforms of tHe"two" great'"pdll il eal' parties, p. 144.
We welcome "trie rielatea promise"Vf' tariff reform now
offered by the Republican party, as tardy recognition
of the righteousness of the Democratic position on
this question; but the people cannot safely Intrust the
execution of this important worh bo a party which Is
deeply obligated to the hjghly protected interests as
Is the Republican party.....We favor immediate revision
of the tariff by the reduction of import duties. We
demand the immediate repeal of the tariff on wood pulp,
print paper, lumber, timber and logs, and that those
articles be placed upon the free list.
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Taft was elected to the presidency over Bryan by a
vote of 321 to 162 In the electoral college, and by a
popular vote of 7,680,000 to 6,410,000.

In the Senate

there were 59 Republicans and 32 Democrats, and In the
House, 218 Repu&icans and 171 Democrats. ^

Taft called

attention to tariff revision in his first Inaugural
38
address.
The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 was to have been
arranged on the basis of protection equal to the differ
ence between the cost of production at home and abroad
39
plus a reasonable profit.
Carried to Its logical
conclusion such an arrangement would prohibit trade. In
stead the usual log rolling methods were used.

In the

Senate 847 amendments, mostly upward, were added to the
bill.

It passed the Senate on July 8 by a vote of 45 to 34.

It passed both houses as reported from the

conferencd com

mittee.
A congressional committee had recommended that the
duties on paper be lowered and pulp be admitted free,
both changes were to be conditional on the
the Canadian export duties.

but

repeal of

The act as passed provided

37. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 30.
38. Congressional'1Beeord, 44, part 1, 61st Cong., Special
sess. of Senate, p. 3.
39. Taussig, op. clt., pp. 361-408 gives a good discussion
of the tariff. See above, p. 31.
40. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 32.

**33“
for additional duties on paper and pulp if Canadian re
gulations remained unchanged.

Lumber on the free list had

been defeated by a vote of 198 to 184 in the House, but
the rates were reduced.

Coal and iron were dutiable, but

hides were placed on the free list. ^
Duties on Canadian goods as a whole were only slightly
reduced and the general average of all duties wes about
equal to that of the Bingley Act.

Hates had been reduced

on many articles of which the United States was primarily
an exporter.

It was provided that a maximum rate of twenty-

five per cent increase over the general schedule could be
imposed against countries discriminating against the United
States.

The President could declare the maximum rates In
An
force when in M s opinion there was discrimination.
On the basis of the French Treaty giving concessions

to France not granted to the United States, It seemed that
43
Canada was subject to the maximum tariff.
Canada was
ready to fight duty with duty and there was danger of a
tariff war.^President did not want to open the question by
applying the maximum rates and sent a commission to the
Dominion.
41. Beciprocity with Canada, p. 31.
42. Ibid., p. 32-33.
43. See above, p. 30.

-34Professor, Henry C. Jfmory, Chairman of the United
States Tariff Board, and Charles M.,Pepper, commercial
advisor for the State Department, were received in March,
1910, by Premier Sir. Wilfred Laurier and W. S. Fielding,
Minister of Finance.

Hie United States representatives

argued that since the United States gave Canada her lowest
rates,.she should get nmost favored nation” treatment.

The

Canadian representatives said that the concessions to France
were for equal concessions.
44
any agreement*

The conference ended without

President Taft met Fielding at Albany in March, 1910,
and assured him of the desire of the United States for better
commercial relations.

Fielding said that the United States

was responsible for the situation and that the Canadian
45
concessions would be few*
The United States agreed to the Canadian intermediate
rates Instead of the general rates on thirteen articles
imported from the United States, including tableware,
cottonseed oil, leather, perfumery, watch movements, and
photographs.

Hone were articles of importance in our

export trade to Canada.^®
44. Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 23.
Reciprocity with Canada, p. 33.
45 o Ibid *, p * 34 *
46. Ibid., p. 34. The value pf such articles imported into
Canada from the United States was less than 05,000,000
and the loss of revenue to Canada, $200,Q0G<»

Although t;e concessions were slight, the Conserv tlves
opposed them as cowardly.

Lauri <--v said such action was

necessary to- avoid a toriff war.

Taussig sums up the

sittJP.ilon thus:
SJegotiati ons with Canada led to but the slightest
concessions. That Country refused, as already stated,
to modify her regulaii ens as to wood ulr>, or to make
any changes of moment in her general tariff system.
S'-me minor c >anges were secured, which enabled the
administration to make a respectable s^ow of having
gained something in the way of lower duties; and a
tariff -ar, w* ich at one time seened probable, was
averted.
47.

-36The Reciprocity Agreement of 1911
Negotiations
The Beclproeity Agreement; of 1911 was an Important
event in the tariff relations "between the United States and
Canada.

During the conferences in regard to the readjust

ment of Canadian tariff rates In return for which the United
States would not impose her maximum rates, the question of
closer commercial relations had been discussed.

Secretary

of State, P. C. Knox, wrote to W. So Fielding, Canadian
Minister of Finance#on March 26, 1910.
Let me take this opportunity to express by his
direction the desire of the President that your Govern
ment will find it convenient to take up with this
Government, at such time and in such manner as may bo
mutually satisfactory, the consideration of a readjust
ment of our trade relations upon the broader and more
liberal lines which should obtain between countries so
closely related geographically and racially, as Indicat
ed by the President in his recent public utterances. 2.
The question of reciprocal trade relations was referred to
at various times during 1910 both by persons connected with
the government of the United States and with that of Canada
3
as well as by the press.
In November, 1910, President Taft sent Charles M. Pepper,
L. See above, p. 36.
2. KecljX’ocity with Canada, p. 35.
Quoted from House of
Commons' Debates, March 30, 1910. p. 5972.
3. Canadian AnnuaT Review, 1910, p, 621, gives a list of
short quotations of variousimportant men and papers
referring to reciprocity during the year 1910.

37«
commercial advisor for the State Department, and Henry
Martyn Hoyt, counsellor for the Department of State,
and J. G. Poster fcd Ottawa to discuss

the tariff problem

with W, 0* Fielding and William Paterson* ^

The meetings

continued from the fourth to* the tenth of November, when
they adjourned to meet at Washington early in January.
The Toronto Globe stated editorially on November 11.
It is certain that Mr. Fielding and Mr. Paterson
will consent to no serious lowering of Canadian duties
in return for the free entry of Canadian lumber, ores,
wood pulp, and similar things into the United States.
The free entry of articles of that sort is almost certain
to form part of any tariff measure which can became law
in the United States during the next two years, and that
without reference to Canada’s tariff. The Dominion is
not going to pay for United States tariff reductions
that would be made as a matter of course and without
negotiations.
5
In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1910,
President Taft said that the American representatives had
been sent to Ottawa with instructions to take steps necessary

4. Keenleyslde, op. cit., p. 311.
Canadian AnnuaX Review, 1910, p. 624.
5. Ibid/, i9ll, p. 24.
5. Canadian Annual Review, 1910, p. 624,
YtM/,

8------
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to make a trade agreement,

The President urged closer

trade relations with Canada*
The Conferences were resumed in Washington on January 7,
1911*

The Canadian agents were W. 0* Fielding, Minister of

Finance, and William Paterson, Minister of Customs.

The

6. Congressional Record, 46, Part 1, 61 st. Gong., 3rd sess.,
p. 19o "The policy of hroader and closer trade relations
with the Dominion of Canada, which was initiated in the adjust
ment of the maximum and minimum provisions of the tariff act
of August, 1910, had proved mutually beneficial. It Justi
fies further efforts for the readjustment of the commercial
relations of the two countries so that their commerce may
follow the channels natural to contiguous countries, and he
conmensurate with the steady expansion of trade and industry
on both sides of the boundary line. The reciprocation on the
part of the Dominion Qovernment of the sentiment which was
expressed by this Government was followed In October by the
suggestion that it would be glad to have the negotiations,
which had been temporarily suspended during the suraramer,
resumed. In accordance with this suggestion of the Secretary
of State, by my direction, dispatched two representatives
of the Department of State as special commissioners to
Ottawa to confer with representatives of the Dominion
Government. They were authorized to take such steps for
formulating a reciprocal trade agreement as might be necessayy
and to receive and consider any propositions which the
Dominion Government might care to submit,
"Pursuant to the instructions issued, conferences
were held by these commissioners with officials of the Dom
inion government at Ottawa in the early part of November.
"Hie negotiations were conducted on both sides in a
spirit of mutual accomodation. The discussion of the common
commercial Interests of the two countries had for its object
a satisfactory basis for a trade arrangement which offers
the prospect of a freer Interchange for the products of the
United States and of Canada, The conferences were adjourned
to be resumed In Washington in January, when It is hoped
that the aspiration of both Governments for a mutually
advantageous measure of reciprocity will be realized©

=39=
British An:bassador# James Bryce, cooperated.

The Secretary

of State, P. C. Knox, took charge for the Baited States
with C« M. Pepper and Chandler P. Anderson of the Treasury
7
Department assisting.
Various Canadian ministers joined from time to time In
the negotiations; Sir. Allen Aylewworth, Minister of Justice,
and L. P. Bordeur, Minister of Marine, who came to consult
with the United States authorities on the question of
fisheries regulations; G. P. Graham, Minister of Railways,
who had business with the Interstate Commerce Commission;
and Mackenzie King, Minister of Labour, who was to speak
before the Civic Federation.®
ed in the issue.

All were indirectly interest

There was little public interest taken in

the subject in either Canada or the United States, but
Americans connected with the negotiations were confident of
success.
The discussions were oral and informal and, therefore,
there is little correspondence.

After the agreement was

reached, the Canadian commissioners put their understanding
of it in a formal letter; Secretary Knox*s reply agreed.
9
These two are the only important official documents.
Canadian Annual Review, 1911, pp. 24-25.
3. ibid., p. 26 b'
'"Tl"r
1
9. See Appendix, pp XI-XXI.
Senate Documents, 84, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., Documents
relating to Reciprocity with Canada, Serial 5&42S,
pp. 1-10.
Cong. Record, 46, part 2, 61st Cong, 3rd sess., pp. 1516-17.

-40President Taft presented the arrangement to Congress
with a special message on January 26, 1911, in which he said
that all causes of friction with Canada

had been settled and

the path was open for improved commercial relations . He
favored the agreement because it would help conserve our
natural resources
argument*

but he rejected the reduced cost of living

He further argued that the agreement opened the

Canadian market on more favorable terms and also would be of
commercial advantage to Canada.
10
ship of the two states.

It would promote the friend-

The Agreement
The agreement was in the form of four schedules?
Schedule A was a free list to be adopted by both countries?
Schedule B was a list of articles to be admitted by both
countries at identical rates? Schedule C was for Canada and
D for the United States.
The agreement was not

to be a formal treaty but to be

put into effect by concurrent legislation and "it is distinct
ly understood that we do not attempt

to bind for the future

action of the United States or the Parliament of Canada, but
that each of these authorities shall be absolutely free to
10. See Appendix, pp. 11-X.
Senate Documents, 84, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., Serial 5942,
preface.
Cong. Record, 46, part 2, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., pp.
1515-16.

-41make any change of tariff policy or any matter covered by
11
the present arrangement that may be deemed expedient*”
Schedule A. contained natural products, mostly Import
ed by the United States*

Almost all agricultural products

except wool were Included and fish, unfinished lumber, gyp
sum, pulp, pulp-wood and paper valued at not more than four
cents a pound*

A few manufactured articles were mentioned

such as cream seperators and coke which had entered Canada
free before.

Iron and steel sheets were also on the free

list*
Schedule B. was a list of articles to be admitted by
both countries at identical rates, mostly semi-manufactured
articles and food stuffs, including meats, canned vegetables,
flour, farm machinery, automobiles, leather, miscellaneous
manufacturer of iron and steel.

These goods were normally

Imported into Canada from the United

States.

Schedule G. was a list of articles to be admitted into
the United States at stated rates, as aluminum, shingles,
lumber, iron ore, and coal slack.
Schedule B set reduced rates for admittance into Canada
11. See Appendix, p. XII
Senate Documents, 84, 61 st Cong., 3rd sess., Serial
5942, p. 1.
Cong. Record, 46, part 2, 61 st Cong., 3rd sess.,
p. 1516.

on trees, peanuts, condensed milk, unsweetened biscuits,
12
canned fruits, coal and cement.
The effect of the arrangement is shown in the following
figures based upon Canadian-American trade in 1910.

free
reduced
same

Canadian
imoorts
50$
11$
39$

'

free
dutiable
-

#108,800,000
108,700,000
—

United States
imports
82$
8$
9$
#78,600,000
16,500,000

-

-

;

J3

By a resolution in the Canadian House on January 26,
1911, Canada promised to extend to Great Britain any re14
ductions in the agreement with United States.
The
effect, however, would not have been great due to the
character of the trade included in the Reciprocity Agree
ment— -mostly bulky and perishable products.
nThe arrangement affected nearly one-half of all
the imports into the United States from Canada, but
only one-fifth of the improts Into Canada from the .
United States. The articles placed upon the free list
included more than 40 per cent of the United States
imports from Canada and less than 10 per cent of the
Canadian Imports from the United States. Of the
articles placed on the free lists, there had been
on the dutiable list in the United States over 76
12. Reciprocity with Canada, pp. 39,41-45.
Senate Documents^'84, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., Documents
Relating to Reciprocity with Canada, Serial 5942, pp. 4-10.
Cong. Record, 46, part 2, 61st Cong., 3rd sess.,
pp. 1516-1519.
13. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 54.
14. IbidV, p Y 57.
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per cent, in Canada less than 17 per cent. The
previous United States duties v*ere to remain on less
than 5, per cent of the imports from Canada; and the
Canadian duties were to remain on more than 35 per cent
of the imports from the United States. The Canadian
imports from the United States, were, however, of much
greater total value than the United States imports
from Canada, and the absolute values of the imports
to be affected in each direction were almost the same.15
The Agreement In the United States
President Taft put the Reciprocity Agreement before
a Republican majority which favored protection and a Dem
ocratic minority which favored lowered duties but opposed
the party in power.

The Democratic Caucus, however, by a

vote of 90 to 22, and later, on a motion presented by Champ
Clark, by unanimous vote, passed the following resolution
on February 6, 1911.
"Whereas the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement ne
gotiated by the Reciprocity Commission of the Dominion
of Canada and the President of the United States, form
ulated in accordance with the Democratic platform de
mands, is a reduction of some of the prohibitive
schedules in the Payne Tariff law, will tend to ex
pand the trade of the United States in the Dominion of
Canada, and Is in part a recognition of the principles
the Democratic party has contended for in its own plat
form, therefore, be It resolved, that this Caucus en
dorse Canadian Reciprocity and bind ourselves to vot§
for a bill carrying it into effect." 16
15. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 873.
For f ther stati stical’ materi'ai see:
Reciprocity with Canada, pp. 42-45, 50, 51, 53, 55, 59,
61,’ 63”.
Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, p. 373.
Senate'1"Documents, 184, '61 st Cong7, "3rd sess., Serial
5942, pp. 12-73.
16. Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 59.
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The Republicans were divided on the issue.
In the United States the agreement was favored by
the Manufacturing. Interests which gained easier access to
Canadian markets
erials.

and lowered duties on incoming raw mat

Those manufacturers with branch establishments in

Canada were opposed to the arrangement because it gave equal
advantage to their competitors, but on the whole, the man17
ufacturers had nothing to lose and some to galn.
The Farming interests were opposed to reciprocity.
They argued that they were at last getting the benefit of
protection and this was an attempt to cut their, advantage
without a proportional cut on duties on manufactured art
icles .
Farmers of the Central West feared the fall in the
price of wheat due to Canadian competition.

While the

price in Winnipeg was often six to ten cents lower than In
Minneapolis, prices within the United States varied by
localities from twenty to twenty five cents.

Both Canada

and the United States are wheat exporting nations and the
17. "in explanation of this attitude, there may be added to
the reason ordinarily attributed for it, that the agree
ment lowered duties upon raw materials much more than
upon manufacturers, the fact that American manufacturers
with few exceptions did not fiar reductions for their
products much more sweeping than those proposed. Their
large-scale and efficient production was not threatened
by the competition In their own home markets of the small
er Canadian plants. The agreement offered them a chance
to compete on slightly better terms for the Canadian field,
and at the same time it had some promise of lowering the
cost of living for their employees.”
Reciprocity with Canada, p. 76.

price of wheat is untimately sent By world conditions.
Lumber Interests opposed the measure.

IB

The conservation

of natural resources argupraent had been used by President
Taft in his message putting the bill before Congress. 19
Ninety-nine per cent of the imports of lumber into the United
States came from Canada, while the United States shipped some
hardwoods to Canada*

Free lumber probably would not reduce

prices but might prevent undue rise in the future.

The M g

companies enlisted the aid of the small holders and maintained
that the supply of lumber in the United States was in no
danger of being depleted.

The manufacturers of wood pulp,

especially those owning timber lands, opposed the measure.
The newspapers favored cheaper paper.
The cost of living argument was brought forward ex
tensively and the advantages of specialisation were pointed
out.

In fact, all the arguments for and agrinst protection

in general were used.

18o Reciprocity with Canada, p. 75.
Report'of',,'Fih'ance Commit tee in House documents, 84, 61st
Cong., 3rd sess., Serial 5942. The fish and cattle
industries were also opposed to reciprocity.
19. See appendix, p. iV.
20. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 68-70.

-46Acceptance of the Agreement in the United States
Samuel W. McCall introduced a ratification measure into
the House of Representatives on Januray 28, 1911, which was
reported back from the Ways and Means Committee on February
■21
11, with a recommendation in favor of its passage.
It passed
the House on February 14, 1911, by a vote of 221 to 93, 142
Democrats and 79 Republicans supporting it, and 5 Democrats
22
and 88 Republicans opposing it.
The bill was received by the Senate on February 15,
and referred to the Finance Committee from which It was
reported without recommendation on February 24,

Debate

proceeded until the close of the session without the bill
»

being passed.

President Taft called a special session of
23
the new Sixty-second Congress to consider the measure.
Congress convened April 4, 1911.

The House had 228

Democrats and 160 Republicans and the Senate 41 Democrats
24
and 50 Republicans.
President Taft in his second message
on the Canadian agreement said:
The agreement In Its intent and in Its terms was
purely economic and commercial. While the general
21. 61st Cong., 3rd sess., H. R. 32216.
Senate Documents, 84, 61st Cong., 3rd
Cong. Record, 46, part 2, 61st Cong.,
22. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 77.
Cong. "Record," 46,"T'part "3, 61st Cong.,
2564.
23* Cong. Record, 46, part 4, 61st Cong.,
24. Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 59.

sess., Serial 5942.
3rd sess., p. 1618.
3rd sess., pp. 25063rd sess., p. 3255.
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stabject was under discussion by the Commissioners*
I felt assured that the sentiment of the people of the
United States was such that they would welcome a
measure which would result in an increase of trade on
both sides of the boundary line and would open up a
reserve of productive resources of Canada to the great
mass of our consumers on advantageous conditions and
that would* at the same time, offer a broader outlet
for the excess products of our farms and of many of our
industries»
25
A bill embodying the agreement was reported from the
Ways and Means Committee of the House and unanimously re
commended*

Amendments were voted down because they might
Oft
obstruct passage In the Senate®
April 21, 1911, the bill was passed by a vote of 268 to
89, with 29 not voting®

202 democrats, 65 Republicans and

1 Socialist upheld the bill and 11 Democrats and 78 Republic®
pvj
ans opposed it®
The bill was reported in the Senate on June 13 without
recommendations.

All amendments were rejected and on July 22,

1911, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 53 to 27,

31

Democrats and 22 Republicans sup orting and 3 Democrats and
24 Republicans opposed.

July 26, 1911, President Taft signed

the bill.
25. Cong. Record, 47, part 1, 62nd Cong., 1st sees., p. 46.
Canadian Annual Review, 1911, pp. 58-60®
26. 62nd Cong., 1st sess., H. R., 4412.
Reciprocity with Canada, p . 77.
27. ^bid., p. 78.
Cong. Record, 47, part 1, 62nd Cong., 1st sess., pp.
541-560.
28. Cong. Record, 47, part 4, pp. 3167-3175. By the committee
report, the Root amendment had been recommended. By this
the agreement should be inoperative as far as pulp wood,
pulp and paper were concerned until export restrictions
on pulpwood be removed by the Canadian provinces.

-48The Agreement in Canada
The Liberal Party in Canada supported the Reciprocity
Agreement; the Conservatives opposed it.

Several economic

reasons were given for opposition to the measure.
R. L. Borden, Leader of the Conservatives, argued that jsuch j
!

an arrangement was against the conservation of natural
resources; Canada xvox^ld merely feed the industries of the
United States and her own manufacturing plants would
deteriorate.

pQ

The railway interests feared that trade would

tend to move north and south instead of east and west.

The

Canadian manufacturers opposed the Reciprocity Agreement
believing it would be a wedge in general tariff reduction and
that the farmers would buy in the market in which they sold.
The insecurity of the duration was used as an argument
both for and against| the agreement.

The Liberals showed that

Canada was not permanently bound while the Conservatives
pointed out the economic dangers of shifts in trade that
would be caused by sudden abrogation.

29. Canadian Annual Review, 1911. p. 169.
30v H. S. Patton, ’’Reciprocity with Canada, the Canadian
viewpoint,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August,
1921, pp. 574-595.
'
'

SO

Another Conservative argument was that tariff reduction
was expected In the United States; the Democrats were gaining
power and discontent with tariff was being expressed more
often.

It was expected that the next tariff would be much

lower and Canada would gain as much without paying with
concessions. 31
The Grange organizations favored Reciprocity because
it would bring them access to the American market and promised
them lower living expenses.
Fifteen years of anti-administration sentiment and
opposition to the Laurier naval policy were also used as issues
in the reciprocity election. •Reciprocity was the main cam
paign question.

Annexation speeches of American public men

made good material for the Imperialism and national Policy
i.

campaign. 32

Reciprocity and loyalty to the empire were

declared to be opposed.

In vain did the Liberals argue that

the agreement was an economic issue and not a matter of
loyalty.

The Conservatives played on national sentiment to

win the election.

31. For extensive arguments on both sides as given in speeches
and the press both in Canada and the United States see
Canadian Annual Review, 1911, pp. 67-179.
32* Ibid., pp. 61-71.
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The annexation references of various people in the
United States were fuel for the Conservative campaign. 33
The idea that reciprocity would ultimately lead to annexation
was stressed by the Hearst publications and copies were
circulated in Canada. *-4

President Taft made statements

unfortunate for the success of reciprocity.

His arguments

for conservation of natural resources were used in Canada
as an argument against the measure and for Canadian conserva
tion.

Most unfortunate was his statement:
The amount of Canadian products that we
would take would make Canada only an adjunct of
the United States. It would transfer all their
important business to Chicago and New York, with
their bank credits and everything else; and it
would greatly increase the demand of Canada for
our manufactures. 33
The Secretary of State assured Canada of the respect of

the people of the United States for th^ir political organiza
tion.

”The United States recognizes that the Dominion of

Canada is a permanent North American political unity and that
her autonomy is secure. 36
One side of Canadian reaction is shown by Sir James
Whitney, Premier of Ontario.

33. Canadian Annual Review, 1Q11» PP« 61-71 for many examples.
34. Keenleyslde, op . ci11", p . Sl~2.
35. Ibid., p. 312, quoted from ^alker, The Reciprocity of
William H. Taft, p. 15.
'

36. iH'dv, pvsrrr

Reciprocity with Canada, p. 84.
61st Cong., 3rd sess./ House Document, 1418, p. 6.
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There is not an American who does not hope
away down in his heart that Canada will some day
be part of the United States and feel that reci
procity Is the first step in this direction. It
is the means by which annexation will be reached
most quickly. 37
The leader of the Conservatives, Robert L. Borden, said:
I beg Canadians to cast a soberly considered
and serious vote for the preservation of our heri
tage, for the maintenance of our commercial and
political freedom, and for the permanence of Canada
as an autonomous nation of the British Empire. 38
The Agreement was introduced into the Canadian House of
Commons on the same day as it was to Congress, on January 26,
1911.

Debate lasted several months but ’’obstructive tactics”

lead Laurier to appeal to the country and July 29 Parliament
was dissolved. 39
A general election was held on September 31.

The

Conservatives won by a popular vote of 669,000 as against
625,000 for the Liberals.
and the Liberals 88.

The Conservatives had 133 seats

Ontario decided the election for the

Conservatives with 73 members of that party and only 13
Liberals.

The election ended consideration of reciprocity.

The main reason for the failure of reciprocity in
Canada was the ’’bogie” of annexation, turned into a political
Issue by the opposing Conservative party.

37. Keenleyside, op. clt., p. 318, quoted from t1 e Grand
Porks Gazette, September 15, 1911.
38. Keenleyside, op. clt., p. 320 quoted from the Toronto
Star, September 20, 1911.
39. Reciprocity with Canada, p. 84.
40. Ibid., p. 84.

Recent Tariff Relation^ between
the United States and Canada
I

The Underwood Tariff
The election of 1912 brought Woodrow Wilson to the
\

presidency with a Democratic majority in both houses#

The

Democratic platform of that year had favored tariff for -revenue and opposed the Republican policy which Ignored
the interests of the farmer.
We favor the immediate downward revision of the
existing high and in many cases prohibitive tariff
duties, Insisting that material reductions be speedily
made upon the necessities of life. Articles entering
into competition with trust-controlled products and
articles of American manufacture which are sold abroad
more cheaply than at home should be put upon the free
list, le
President Wilson called a special session of the Sixty_
2
third Congress to meet on April 7, 1913. The President, in
a personally delivered message, declared tariff revision to
*2

be the first major consideration of Congress. u

The

1. Platforms of the two great political parties, p . 167.
^he Republican ^arty platform for" T9lS" said:
"We hold that the import duties should be high enough,
while yielding sufficient revenue, to protect adequately
American industries and wages. Some of the existing import
duties are too high, and should be reduced. Readjustment
should be made from time to time to conform to changing
conditions and to reduce excessive rates, but without injury
to any American industry. To accomplish this, correct in
formation is indispensable. This Information can best be
obtained by an expert commission as the large volume of
useful facts contained i n .the recent report of the Tariff
Board has demonstrated." Ibid., p. 185.
2. Cong* Record, 50, part 1, 63rd ^ong., 1st sess., p/ 61.
3. Ibid., PP® 132—133.

-53Underwood Bill had been prepared previously and was ready
for introduction when Congress convened.

It was carried

though the House unamended In May and passed the Senate In
September.

The Underwood Tariff was signed by the President
4
on October 3, 1913.
This tariff made substantial reductions in duties.
Wheat, cattle, corn,:potatoes, eggs, fish, lumber, coal,
agricultural machinery, salted meat, and flour were admitted
c
free. Reductions were made on many other articles.
In the
case of wheat, wheat flour, and potatoes the duty was to be
removed only In case of reciprocal action.
The Tariff of 1913 suspended the pulp wood division
of the Reciprocity act and allowed the unconditional free
Import from Canada of all wood pulp and printing paper rot
worth not more than two and one half cents a pound. It
retained retaliatory duties of 12 per cent plus a contra%

vailing duty equal to the Canadian provincial export duty
on paper above the value of two and one half cents a pound.
In 1916 Paper worth not more than five cents a pound was
4, Cong. Record, Indes, 63d Cong., 1st sess., pseelImport
Duties.
Taussig, o p , clt., pp. 409-446, gives a good discussion
of the passage of the bill.
5. Reciprocity with Canada, pp. 42-45. See chart of rate
comparis oris » 1""
rjn"'"
Dictionary of Tariff Information, United States Tariff
Commission, '( Washington, !
d . 0,, 1924), pp. 866-980,
See chart entitled, ’’Comparison of Tariff acts of 1910,
1913, and 1922.”
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admitted free and in April, 1920, eight cents was substituted
for two years.

Imoorts of printing paoer and nulp increased

greatly as a result*®
dropped.

Maximum and minimum duties were

Additional duties could be imposed by the Secretary

of Treasury where any foreign nation granted subsidies for
7
export.
By the Underwood Tariff Canada obtained much of
what it would have gained by reciprocity.®

The Canadian

Annual Review of Public Affairs for 1913 gives a list of
Q
the chief tariff changes of interest to Canada.
Canadian interest in the tariff of 1913 was not as
great as in the 1911 agreement in spite of the fact that
they gained practically as much in trade concessions.

The

6. Reciprocity with Canada, pp. 50-51.
'^rom 1912 ¥o 1§14, the Imports of printing pa er increas
ed five times. Production of pulp in the United States
increased 15 per cent from 1909 to 1914, and the output of
printing paoer rose about 12 per cent during the same period."
7. Taussig, op. clt., p. 443.
8. Canadian Annual Review, 1915, p. 308. "Canadian popular
condl11ons, bus1ness and politics, were all concerned in the
im1ortant chancres enacted by the United States in its tariff
during 1913. Athe Canadian people were not greatly interested
in the American party struggle or as to how the changes would
affect Democratic or Republican interests but they were
concerned in the large general reductions which followed; in
the possibility that some effect upon popular fiscal opinion
might result from a general freer trade policy on the part
of the United States."
9. Ibid., p. 310. On majiy items the Canadian duties were
now higher than those of the United States.

Liberal view Is shown by A. 0* MacKay In the Edmonton
Bulletin for February 6, 1913.
The removal by the United States of the tariff
against foodstuffs will be of great benefit to this
Province* The value and market price of grain and live
stock will immediately rise* The grain producer and
stockmen will have additional free market he has so long
desired* The increased value and market price of cattle,
hogs, etc., will give a tremendous impetus to mixed
farming, to idiich this Province is naturally so well
adapted. The Increased purchasing power of the farmer
will benefit the business men in the town and American
settlers now free to reach their accustomed higher
10
markets will flock in thousands to our Western Provinces.
The Conservatives took the "we told you so" attitude. H. M.
P. Echarfc, a financial writer said, "its tendency is to make
the cost of living lower in the United States and higher in

11
Canada."

There was some demand for lower tariffs in Canada.

The Manitoba Crain GrowersT Association at their July con12
vention raised a fund of $1,032 to fight for lower tariffs.
The Canadian Council of Agriculture passed tariff re
solutions demandjng an Increase of British preference to
50 percent, and free trade with the mother country in five
years.

It also asked that any trade concessions granted to

any country should also be extended to Great Britain, that
Canada accept the Reciprocity Agreement with the United
States and that foodstuffs, agricultural implements, lumber
10. Canadian Annual Review, 1913. p. 311.
11. Ibid.,p. 3l2.
12. Ibid,, p. 292.

IS
and cement be included in the free list*
The Canadian Manufacturers * Association claimed in
creased manufacturing meant increased markets for the
farmers.

It advocated increased tariffs on iron, steel, and
14

woolens and was opposed to any lowering of the import duties.
War and early post-war tariffs
During the war period, the tariff was overshadowed by
other questions.

Even the Canadian Manufacturers1 Association

ceased temporarily to press the tariff Issue.

By the War

Revenuw Act of 1915, Canada levied an additional war tax of
5 per cent on "preferential” imports and 7| per cent on the
15
Intermediate and general schedules.
In July 1919, the
increase was removed for preferential rates and in May, 1920,
16
for others.
The free listing of’ wheat, wheat flour, and
potatoes was to take advantage of the conditional exemption
17
of those commodities In the Underwood Act.
In the United States the Democrats in their 1916 plat
form upheld the Underwood Tariff and declared themselves in
13. Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 300.
14. Ibid, p. 305. President / . S . Plumber of the Dominion
Steel Corporation said, "It is, I think, a lamentable
feature that a strong tendency of the iron and steel
tariff is to build up secondary industries in Canada,
depending upon foreign manufacturers for their raw
material
15. Patton, op. clt*, p. 584.
16. Reciprocity with Canada, pp. 42-45.
17. Patton, op. 'eft.'",1'"p. H1T4•
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favor of a non-partisian tariff commission.

The Republicans

declared the Underwood Tariff a failure because imports had
increased in spite of war conditions.

They also favored a

tariff commissi*on.

In September of 1916, the Tariff Com18
mission was formed with F. W* Taussig as Chairman.
In 1918, Canada again began to think of tariff.

The

Manufacturers* Association favored a tariff board and a
general revision of customs duties.

The Tariff Committee of

the association drew attention
...(1) to the effect upon Canadian industries of the
United States war embargoes, which prohibited the
export to Canada of various basic materials indispen
sable to essential Canadian industriesj (2) to the fact
that the Canadian Government had remitted duties on im
portations of various manufactured articles used by the
ultimate consumer, whilst leaving duties in force again
st materials which must be imported for the successful
manufacture In Canada of such finished products; (3) to
the effect of this and other Incidents or conditions as
increasing imports from the United States during 1914 and
1918 from 410 to 802 millions while Canadian exports to
the United States only grew from 200 to 434 millions. 19
Hie War Trade Board was created in Canada on February 8,
1918.

It was to aid essential industries^ to direct the dis

tribution of raw materials, and to cooperate with the War
Trade Board of the United States and similar organizations.
A system of licensing was adopted and control exercised over
Canadian trade.

One of the first steps was to place an em-

T8. Platforms of the two great political parties, pp. 192-193.
■ and
19. Canadian Annual Review, 1918. p. 548-549.
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bargo on non-essential goods from the United States such as
boats, perfumery, fruits, paintings, works of art, in order
to help the exchange situation.

Other action was taken from

tine to tine as required, for instance, on July 18 and on
July 27 when, by the request of the United States Government,
lists of imports prohibited except under license were pub20
lished.
The Liberal Party in its convention at Ottawa in August
1919, passed the following resolutions
That the best interests of Canada demand that
substantial reductions of the burden of customs tax
ation be made with a view to the accomplishing of two
purposes of the highest importances
First;-Diminish?ng the very high cost of living
which presses so severely on the masses of the. people.
Second:-Reducing the cost of the instruments of
production in the industries based on the natural re
sources .
• • *

e £« o « e • 0

9
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4>

«

« e o e » o 0 0 0 0 » « o o o o oe o «o

That the British preference be Increased to 50 per
cent of the general tariff. 21
The Progressive tariff policy demanded an immediate and
substantial all-round reduction of customs tariff, British
preference of 50 per cent with free trade in five years,
acceptance of the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911, special
committees of Parliament to hear claims, and that foodstuffs,
agricultural, farm and house machinery, fuel and lubricating
22
oils be placed on the free list.
With both parties, re
ciprocity with the United States was regarded as a step in
20. Ibid., p. 431.
21. Patton, op. clt., p. 589.
Reciprocity with Canada, p. 100/
22. Pat ton, op. clt., p . 590.
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general tariff reduction.
The Liberal Party came into office by the elections of
December, 19210 Progressives, who had made tariff their
isshe, gained many seats, _ Sixty-six of the members elected
supported the tariff platform of the Canadian Council of Agrl
culture*

There were some reductions in the budget, but a
25
sales tax made up the difference.
Meanwhile in the United States, Oongress repealed,

with little debate, the Canadian Reciprocity Act of 1911
24
on October 9, 1919*
0. H- Young of North Dakota pointed
out that Canada had noi reason to pass the Reciprocity
Agreement as she had gained practically as much in the
25
Underwood Tariff.
The Wood-pulp provision had been re
enacted in the Underwood Tariff so it was not affected by
26
the repeal.
A committee to investigate the pulpwood ait23, J. A. Stevenson, "The Canadian Tariff,” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, May,
19237 ppT 1937197*
24* House Kept., No. 156, 66th Cong., 1st sess,, Serial 7592,
part 2.
Some believed the act was still in force, others that
it was automatically repealed by the passage of the
Underwood Bill*
25. Canadian Annual Rev i e w , 1919, p. 117*
26. House 1Rept7r"7&&7 bp *" cl t .
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uation favored some reciprocal arrangement.
The Emergency Tariff of 1921
The Republicans came into power in 1920.

Their platform

said of tariffs
But the Republican Party reaffirms Its belief in
the protective principle ansi pledges itself to a
revision of the tariff as soon as conditions shall
make it necessary for the preservation of the home
market for American labor, agriculture, and industry. 28
27. House Kept. Ho. 1059, 66th Cong., 2nd sess. serial 7654,
"Your committee has made an exhaustive investigation of
the shortage of pulpwood in the United States and finds
it largely due to these embargoes which were laid upward
of ten years ago, and that with the exception of one or
two mills on the Pacific coast, there had not been a
paper mill constructed in the United States since these
embargoes were laid and no additions built to the present
mill.
American paper mills had moved into Canada. The
embargoes applied only to Crown land, but efforts were
being made to apply it also to fee lands.
"The testimony also conclusively shows that we must
have pulp wood from the Crown lands and these three
Dominion provinces, otherwise, our paper mills will
eventually be compelled to close down or move into the
Dominion of Canada. Canada roust have coal, sulpher,
koalin and dyes from the United States or suffer a sim
ilar misfortune."
28. Platforms of the two Great Political Parties, p. 249.
The Democratic Platform said: "We reaffirm the trad
itional policy of the Democratic Party in favor of a tar
iff for revenue only and we confirm the policy of basing
tariff revisions upon Intelligent research of a non-part
isan commission, rather than upon the demands, of selfish
interests temporarily held in obeyance." Ibid., p. 220.

-61Several factors lead to the tariff increase of 1921.
First there was the Republican op -osition to Democratic
policy; second, the feeling of self sufficiency sponsored by
the war; third, the depression of 1920-1921, and fourth, the
OQ

agitation of the western farmers for protection

The

farmers had expanded acreage to meet war demands and were
suffering from the resulting overproduction.
On Way 27, 1921, the Emergency Tariff was passed iraposing high duties upon wheat, corn, meat, wool and sugar.
It was to be in effect for six months but was reenacted until
the passage of the For&ney-McCumber A c t . ^
Lumber was left on the free list because Canadian costs
were similar to those in the United States and Canada was in
a position to Injure American print paper mills by placing
29. F. W. Taussig, ”The Tariff Act of 1922°, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, XXXVI, November, 1922, pp. 5-5.
The impelling Torco was the severe decline in prices
from which the farmers suffered in 1920-21. They were
hardest hit by the sharp industrial revulsion which began
in the latter part of 1920. The prices of wheat, corn,
meats, cotton, sud’enly were cut to one half, even to one
third of-the war figures. The farmers were as helplessly
Ignorant concerning the cause of this decline as they had
been concerning the previous rise. They clamored vociferous
ly for a remedy. Their political representatives hardly less
at sea than the rank and file and eager to ferret out some
sort of response to their constituents turned to the tariff®**
p. 4.
30. Cong. Record, 61, part 7, 67th ^ong., 1st sess., pp. 75447545.
31 Taussig, "The Tariff Act of 1922," p. 5.
Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 147, gives a table of
rat'e changes a ' f f e 1ng Cansda.
See Appendix, p. XXII®

-

a high exnort duty on wood-pulp.

62-

Also it was stated that

95 per cent of Jhe sawmills in British Columbia were owned
■^p

and oner1ted by Americans.1- '
The effect of the United States tariff legislation was
anticipat'd to be disastrous to the farmers and cattlemen of
Can-da.

Canadian comment was restrained and toere was little

expression of t e feeling of* hostility shown against preced33
ing tariff inc■-eases.
The Toronto Globe of November 10,
1921, said t at "The Bmerpvncv Tariff has succeeded in
almost excluding every Canadian farm product except wheat."
On July 1, 1921, the same paper made the statement that,
due to t >e heavy freight rates, the Ca

dian whent-grower

could still afford to sell whe t in the United States and
„
34
receive his returns in American funds.
The ultimate
consumer oaid the duty.
Congressman G. 10. Young, Republican of North Dakota,
argued that exclud ng Canadian exports would cause an in
crease in the disparity of money exc ange rates and hurt
*2 jr

trade.

An Ottawa co-respondent of the Financial Times said

that on the basis of 1920 trade figures, nine-tenths of the
total value of Canadian farm exports to the United States
would be affected.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Canadian Annual Review, 1921, o. 134.
Ibid., o. 146.
Ibid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 135.
Ibid., d . 149.

The Fordney-HcCumber Act
The farmers of the middle west were clamoring for
protection and consequently did not check the protectionist
movement *

The Fordney-McCumber Act was the highest ever

passedo
The Ways and Keans Committee of the House began hear®
Ings on tariff in January* 1921.

A bill was Introduced to
37
the new Congress on June 29* and passed July 21.
The
Finance Committee of the Senate held the bill until April*
1922.

It was passed on August 19, 1922, and then went to

the Conference committee.
38
September 19* 1922.

The amended act became law on

The **ordney-McCumber Act was divided Into four ”titles j"
1. a dutiable list* II. a free list, III. special provisions,
and IV. administrative provisions.

The aim of the Republican
39
party was to model the tariff after that of 1909.
Some
rates were taken directly from the 1909 schedule, others
varied considerably from it.

Ninety-three transfers were

made from the free list to the dutiable list.
37. Gong. Record, 61, part 1, 67th Cong., 1st sess., pp.
pp. 3228 and 4193-5.
67th Cong., 1st sess., H. R. 7456,
38. Taussig, wTariff Act of 1922," p. 6o
Cong. Record, 61, index, 67th Cong., 1st sess., see
Import duties.
39. Abraham Berglund, "Tariff Act of 1922," American Economic
Review, March, 1932, p. 17.
40. jT Marshall Oerstlng, "Is tie agricultural tariff
protective?" The Annals of the American Academy of
Foiltlcal and~S'oclaI"ScTencesT January/
pir“%380

^•64
By the flexible provision of the Tariff of 1922, the
Tariff Commission could recommend an increase of a decrease
of up to 50 per cent*

The president could accept or reject

such recommendations* , The act provided:
That in order to regulate the foreign commerce
of the United States and to put into force and effect
the policy of the.. Congress by this act intended,
whenever the President, upon investigation of the
differences in the cost of production of articles
wholly or in part the growth or product of the United
States and of like or similar articles wholly or in
part the growth or product of competing foreign count
ries, shall find It thereby shown that the duties fixed
do not equalize the said differences in the cost of
production In the United States and the principle
competing country he shall by such investigation ascer
tain said differences and determine and proclaim the
changes in classification or increases or decreases in
any rote of duty provided in this act shown by said
ascertained differences In such costs of production
necessary to equalize the same*
41 .
The Tariff Commission was to conduct such Investigations.
The tariff as it particularly affected Canada is shown
in a list of rates given in the Canadian Annual Review for
1922*

40

Canada felt that the United States had done her

worst.

The exports to the United States are now those
«
43
necessary to United States industry*

41* Burglund, op. clt., p. 31.
Dictionary of Tariff Information, pp. 332-333.
Tariff Act' of 1922, Title lil, paragraph 315c
42. Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 94.
“"See Appendix, p. XXIII.
Donald M. Marvin, ”The Tariff Relationship of the United
States and Canada,” The Annals of.the American Academy
of Political and octal"sciences, Januaryfl lggQ, p"o2'52o
48. Marvin, o£ clt., p. 232.. Exports to the United States dur
ing the year ending July, 1928, were newsprint,$122 million!
woodpulp, $38 million; unmanufactured wood, $75 million;
beverages, $24 million; hides, $11 million; and metals,
$72 million; or a total of $340 unil:Tl<offl of the $480 million
export to the United States.

-
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An Ottawa correspondent of The London Economist said
that the new tariff affected 40 per cent of all the exports
from Canada to the United States In 1920,- or an amount equal
to over 25 per cent of the value of all Canadian exports to
44
all countries*
Senator ^alsh of Montana opposed the bill.

In a speech

on July 12, 1922, he said:
A duty uv.on wheat of the rate pro nosed will, in
my opinion, result (1) In lessening the export of all
manufactured and food products to Canada? (2) in the
reduction in the volume of railway transportation
business from Canada to American ports, and a conse
quent reduction in the ocean traffic from American
ports; (3) the loss of mill feed, a valuable by
product of the flour which is greatly demanded by
producers of milk and dairy products; (4) a loss 16
our distributing, elevating and stoaage interests
which would handle this great flood of Canadian wheat;
and (5) an Indirect loss to the American farmer through
the effect of the Canadian floor upon International
price levels, which would, In turn, react upon domestic
prices* 45.
The London Times on September 22, 1922, made the follow
ing statement.
Eagerly desirous to supply the world’s market with
American merchandise, thepHited States Is taking steps
to make it as difficult as possible to receive payment.
.... The farmer will discover that restrictions on im
ports must depress the prices obtainable for United
States products abroad through scarcity of credits
available in the United States to pay for themo
460

4 4 o "Fordney ’Gloom* in Canada,” Literary Digest, September 3,
1921, p a 19 o
45* Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p« 93.
46. I b i d p « 95o

-66Figures for exports from Canada for 1932 will
illustrate the trade decrease.
WcTirie in”'export to
the United States
Cattle
Cheese
Apples
Ears
Beef

62,786
23,988
331,559
1,382,481
55,347

head
cwt
bus.
dollars
cwt

Increase" 'in'"export"
to Great Britain
15,966
14,163
20,469
168,153
15,316

■vr
In 1922 Reciprocity was again discussed in connection
with tariff questions. In February the Canadian Minister of
Finance, W'. S. Fielding, was in Washington and it was
rumored that he was sounding the possibilities for a trade
agreement. After his return to Ottawa on March 2, Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, directed the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce to Investigate the products which
might be included in a possible reciprocity arrangement.
t

Fielding, in a statement to the Canadian press on March 7,
said that no agreement was possible until the Fordney bill
was acted upon by the United States Congress.48
47. Canadian Annual Review, 1983, p. 70.
48. I b i d . , 1923, p. 91. Fielding in his press statement
said: ”My visit to the United States was for two purposes.
One was to attend to important financial arrangements in
Hew York} the other was to make what I amy call a preli
minary iraquiry, somewhat informal in character, as to
the disposition of leading public men In the United States
toward better trade relations between that country and
Canada.”

Canadian farmers, as always, favored more liberal trade
relations with the United States*

Sir Edmund Walker in an

interview said that any agreement with the United States
would be subject

to termination by that country without

consideration of
49
undesirable*

Canada*s Interests and therefore was

During 1923, there was discussion
of an embargo on

in the United States

coal shipped to Canada and in Canada

retaliatory stoppage of electricity.

ofa

Meithfer became matters

of legislation*

49. Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 91.
"STr". hdjmind Walker*s statement was: ”We couldn’t im
agine a treaty without the power of the United ^tates to end
it, and we have seen enough to know that this would be done
without the slightest consideration for us. Such a treaty
would result in our methods of oroductlon and transportation
being adjusted to the market of the United States, if such
a market was created, and at the cancellation of such a
treaty we should probably be placed at a very great dis
advantage * ”
50. Canadian Annual Review, 1925, pp. 76-77•
^ d t e ^ ' W o m the Mon1
trealjStar«: " The very fr.ct that it
lies within the power of the Cnited States to place an em
bargo upon coal and thereby cause thousands of the citizens
of the Dominion considerable inconvenience, added expense»
and possible discomfort, should startle us out of the
complacent lethargy into which we have fallen over our own
fuel supply. Canada is said to own 17 per cent of the
world’s fuel supply, which should be enough to satisfy our
needs many times over. Instead of this, we are dependent
upon a foreign country for our supply*”

In the same year, l?« S. Fielding asked the Canadian
House to grant permission to prohibit the export of pulpwood.

Settlers objected, fearing the loss of a market for

their wood supply*

Development of manufacturing In Canada
.
51
was an object of the proposed embargo.
A commission
appointed to study the question handed a report in giving
both sides but making no recommendations.

It said that

any action was a matter of government policy*

The Canadian

Pulp and Paper Association favored an embargo or a graduated
export tax, but the Canadian Fulpwood Association was against
52
such measures.
Ho government action was taken.
In 1926 there was a reduction of the automobile tax.
Parts not made in Canada were admitted free.

The five per

cent excise tax was removed on automobiles valued at less
that $1,800.

Cars 40 per cent Canadian made were entitled

to a drawback, a reduction of 10 per cent of valuation.
55
Canadian car manufacturers objected to the changes.
51. Canadian Annual Review, 1923, p. 79, quoted from the
Montreal 'Star of June'WriCVV1*it would be no more than a
legitimatedevelopment of our traditional policy of encourag
ing home industry if we compelled the manufacture of every
stick of Canadian pulpwood into a finished product before It
left the country. We surely have a right to .rescue our land
from the old imputation that it was the home of ’hewers of
wood and drawers of water’ for the luckier people of the South.
Adam Short t, " Canada *s Policy respecting pulpwood,” Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
March, 1924. The autHor saYa that large companies were more
careful cutters because of large capital outlay and the per
manent interests of the United States required that the res
ources of Canada be conserved* The United States was the
largest purchaser of Canadian wood products*
52. Canadian Annual Review. 1924-5, pp. 82-83.
Ib i d . , 1925-26, pp. 248-249.
53. Ibid., 1925-26, pp. 75-76.

Reciprocity was again talked of in Canada In 1927.
The Canadian Prime Minister* Mc&enzl© King* suggested a
trade agreement but no action was taken. 54
The Hawley-Smoot Act.
During the campaign of 1928* tariff was only a minor
issue in the United States.

Both parties favored protection.

President Hoover was in favor of higher duties on agricul
tural products to help the farmers.

He had promised a

special session of Congress to consider the agricultural
problems.

Debate on the tariff measure continued through

the special session beginning June, 1929 and lasted'pint il
56
the passage of the Hawley-Smoot Act in June, 1930.
The
act as passed had few wholehearted supporters.

Taussig

describes the passage of the bill thus?
’’The tariff bill as reported by the Committee to the
House contained concessions to the farmer element in
the higher duties on agricultural products, but also a
54. "Reciprocity’s Ghost Stalks Again,” Literary Digest,
April 9, 1927, p. 12. “Strange to say, it is hard times
among our farmers that seems the chief obstacle in the path
of achieving reciprocity, while it is hard times among
Canadian farmers that makes it an active issue." The Toronto
Globe said:
"Mr. Coolldge has been struggling with the
farmers of the Middle *©st ever since he went to Washington,
because their products have to compete in the world’s markets
with the output of countries were costs of production are
lower, and he cannot satisfy them. He would hesitate long
before permitting Canadian farm products to enter on a lower
tariff basis
55. Platforms of the two great political parties, pp. 298 ;

Mflrsir:—

!
--------

56. Cong. Record, 72, part 12, Index, 71st Cong., 2nd Seas'#
See Import Duties.

70large number of increases in the rates on other goods—
changes sometimes great and sometimes small, sometimes
on important articles and again on petty ones* The
House itself would not have it so. This and that
Representative district felt that fair treatment had
not been accorded, and wanted a share in the largesse?
and indeed the bill evidently represented no consistent
policy, but merely the compromises and concessions
within the Committee itfself* The House revolted.
Ammendmonts were liberally accepted by the Committee,
Such as to bring about a distribution of favors all
around. Everybody got pretty much what he wanted.
Constructed in this fashion the bill pa ssed the House
and made its way to the Senate.
57.
The Senate made more decreases than increases.

The
CQ

Agricultural interests were still dissatisfied.

President

Hoover in a message of dune 15, 1950, defended his signature
KQ
on the basis of the flexible clause.
The Hawley-Smoot Act, like the Pordney-McCumber Act,
was divided into four titles? I a dutiable list, II a free
list, III various provisions including the flexable clause,
60
and 17 administrative regulations.
The duties of the
Tariff Commission were also included in Title III.

The

Commission was empowered to make recommendations on up
t o .50 per cent Increase or decrease and the President was
61
free to accept or reject such recommendstlons.
The
bill had an average of about 20 per cent above that of the
Fordney-McCumber Bill. 62*
57. Taussig, "Tariff of 1929-30,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, November, 1929, p. 183.
58r«lri'Tt>idT, p. 184.
59. "Hie Hawley-Smoot Tariff,” Current History, August, 1930,
p. 979.
60. Burglund, "Tariff Act of 1930,” American Economic Review,
September, 1930, p. 469.
"~r......
61. Ibid., p. 476.
62. Current Hist., August, 1930, p. 978.

71Current History said:

,

But although the Hawley-Smoot bill raised the average
rate on agricultural raw materials from 38.10 to
48.42 per cent, it can hardly be termed limited re
vision* Charges were made in 1,122 rates or 34 per
cent cf the total. The average rates on manufactures
was raised from 31.02 to 34.3. 63
Increases were made on cattle, milk, butter, cream, wheat,
lumber, flax,' hides, and ores. 64
Canadian Attitude and Tariffs
Immediately after the passage of the Hawley-Smoot Act,
Canada made some tariff changes,

On June 16, the Canadian

Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, said that while Canada de
sired to maintain friendly economic relations with the United
States, the new tariff had forced Canada to increase her
duties on certain articles, particularly agricultural pro
ducts, to the level applied against her.

He said an effort
65
would be made to direct trade to Great Britian.
The New Canadian Tariff, according to the Literary
t

Digest for May 24* 1930, did not mention the United States
but provided for cmutervaillng duties equal to the scale of
duties imposed by any country on Canadian products.

The

63. Cur. Hist., pp. cit., p. 979.
Percentages can only be used as rough estimated.
Many different systems arc used in arriving at the
figures of tariff percentages.
* ..
64. Berglund, op. clt., p. 472. gives a table comparing
some of the rate's in 1913, 1922, 1930.
65. Cur. Hist., Aug. 1930, p. 981.
Literary BSagest, May 24, 1930, p. 10.

Minister of Finance said:

"This budget is frankly framed

to enable us to buy more freely from those countries which

66
buy from us*”

This provision for raised duties was Canada *s

answer to the American tariff.
Tariff was the dominating election issue in Canada in
the next election.

After the Conservative victory of July

28, 1930, a general horizontal increase was expected.

Dur

ing an emergency session of the Dominion Parliament in Sept
ember higher rates were placed on 130 items.

The measure was

passed so that the prime Minister could sail to London by
67
October 1st.
Premier Bennett received guarantees of the
manufacturers that higher duties uould not mean higher
68
prices to the consumers.
Mr. Bennett said the revision
69
was to aid the unemployment problem.
66.”Canada *s War on our tariff,” L i t e r a r y D i g e s t , M a y 24. 1 9 3 0 .
67.”Canadaf8 Unemployment Tariff,” Literary Dig., Oct. 4,
1930, p. 15.
Some think the increases were mainly for greater effect
of Canadian preference at the British Imperial Conference
in London in October.
68. Ibid., p. 15.
69. "The Canadian Tariff,” Current History, Nov., 1930,
p. 285.
■Prime Minister Bennett urged his emergency tariff as
a remedy for the unemployment and promised that It
would not increase prices to the consumer, since the
Dominion Government had power, by one very elastic
clause in the bill, to reduce or remove any duty if
producers should unduly raise their prices.”

The tariff on automobiles was raised to give further
preference to Canadian cars*

Business Week stated?

Ottawa correspondence reports that Canadian
communities boasting branches of United States motor
car factories hailed the new regulations with re
joicing and extra editions of newspapers* Some of
these branches were getting ready to shut down and let
the parent companies supply the Canadian market from
across the line* Studebaker at Windsor announced that
It was actually in the closing-out process* General
Motors is reported to have intended to pull out with
most of their line next summer* 70
Premier Bennett in June, 1931, introduced a budget which
included 200 revisions of customs duty*

Bounties were put

on coal, and the iron and steel tariff was raised so high as
to induce foreign factories to establish branches in Canada*
Eighty-seven branch factories of various kinds had located in
Canada since the Hawley-Smoot tariff had cadsed an increase
to be expected in Canadian duties*

There had been a decline

of 30*4 per cent In Canadian imports from the United States
from 1929 to 1930 and of 20 per cent in exports to the United
States o'7*

The Liberals objected that the new tariff was

70* "Bennett jumps automobile duty to hold American Branches,**
Business Week, March 4, 1931, p* 24.
71* 1'«¥'*''lartiet Brebner, **Canada’s lew Tariff,** Current Hist.,
July, 1931, pp. 802-604* The general economic conditions
account for much of the decline but the greater decline In
imports may be a reflection of tariff*
"Up goes Canada’s tariff,** Literary Digest, June 13, 1931,
p. 14. United States Department: of Commerce Statement: "Of
the commodities of particular interest to the American export
ers, the increases in duties include foodstuffs of various
types, .expecially prepared foods? coal, automobiles valued
over $l£9$0, certain structural materials and steel products,
particular classes of machinery, household linen, watches and
clocks, and toys* " Also Increased duty on magazines for
countries paying general duties.
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retaliatory and thus la eking a constructive basis*
The Republican party holds that Canada is following
Our protective systen because it had proved so profitable
to the United States and that a prosperous Canada means a
better market for our goods*
them*

The Democrats disagree with

Most economists agree that artificial barriers are

a hinderance to trade*
Dr* Julius Klein, Assistant Secretary of Commerce,
believes that the raised tariffs of the world are not direct
ed against the United States£

dthers disagree with him*

Dr. Klein said:
Since the enactment of our tariff act, 25 per cent
of the commercially prominent foreign countries have
made major changes in their tariff laws (practically
all upward), but in this mass of legislation the in
stances of provable anti-American reprisals are very
few* Such readjustments are inevitable in every
period of world depression* 74*
Thus at the end of 1931, Canada and the United States
both had higher tariffs than at the beginning of the
century*

72* nUp goes Canada*s tariff,* Literary Digest, June 13, 1931,
pp 14*
73* "Gestures and Roars over Canada *s tariff wall,** Literary
Digest, June 20, 1931, pp. 10-11*
74. ’'High words over high tariffs," Literary Digest, June 13,
1931, pp. 5*6«
.

American Investments in Canada
Industry, t-'»-iffs and investments a-*e closely connected
in t ie comme’c^al end nolJticnl rd-<tiona of two countries.
The amount of fe ^irn securities sold in any country depends
u on "both business

conditions

and international religions.

The Interrelr'-ion of tariffs and investments is evident in
the economic relations of the United Spates and Canada.
Foreign securities sold extensively in the United
States b tween 19 X) and 1904 but a relative few were Canadian
bond issues.
ly from

fter 1905, bond issues

exico, Cuba, end Canada.

acquired volume in 1911.

ere floated principal

"Canadian securities first

In that and the following two years,

3107,944,000 of Can dian socnrlti s were offered to American
1
Investors.
any of these issues were industrial.
Bur-ng t r war,

American capita1 was welcome in Canada

to Increase productivity.
for floating loans.

Canada turned to the United States

fter ^pril, 1917, the United States

(Government bought u '
• ond issues of the allied governments.
American underrvri t! ng of such w-s unnecoss'ry.
Accordingly, Ataoric- n underwriting of foreign securities
recoded shnrply; arid in fe e Inst six months of the year
(except duly, when a 3100,000,000 issue of the Dominion
of Canada was offered) it was of cor.oar- tively minor
importance. In fact, such offerings as did occur were
largely confined to Canadian r7un'clpc=l end rovlncal
Issues, territorial issues, -r d a number of Can-dian
cor moral e floatations. 2
1. handbook of ^-nec’can Underwriting of foreign s curltles.
UnTtoi "St-ites Dept.
"ll"CY," 1’
9'SO),
p« 11.
2. Ibid., p. 29.

-76In April, 1918, by the War Finance Corporation Act, a
committee was formed to Investigate proposed sales of securi
ties to see whether they complied with public interests. It
was not compulsory to submit bond issues, but voluntary
cooperation proved adequate.
During the first of 1919 only a British government
bond Issue and a few Canadian Government and corporate securi
ties were sold in the United States*

The latter part of 1919

and early 1920 was a period of industrial expansion*
ian stocks and bonds became prominent.

Canad

One reason was:

The fact that the pound sterling was at a discount
during the post-war years, while the American dollar
was selling at a 7 to 15 per cent premium, gave further
advantage to American investors In Canada— an advantage
of which they made full use. ....As early as 1818 it
has been estimated that American Investors owned
approximately 30 per cent of all Canadian Industry. 3
1920 ended in an economic depression with a consequent
decrease of capital investment. (see chart A )

In 1922,

there was to Increase in the nominal value of securities
sold in the United-States, but not In the net nominal value.
This was probably due to refunding and currency conditions.
From 1924 to 1929 there was a boom in foreign securities.
The United States importations of gold, government retire
ment of debts, credit expansion, and business prosperity all
aided the securities market»

The underwriting of Canadian

securities was the highest in 1929. (charts A. and C.)
3. Keenleyslde, op* cit., p. 329.
For charts, see Appendix, pp. XXIV-XXVIII.

The

stock market crash In autumn of 1929 included foreign
securities.

There are no reliable figures available for^

the period since 1929.
Hew fork was the post-war money market.
Ihereas before the war* Canadian securities were large
ly offered in London (from 80 to 90 per cent) since
1914 they have been more widely absorbed domestically
and in the United States. In the last five years the
average amount offered in the United States has been
about 46 per cent* domestically 50 per cent* and in
Great Britain 2 per cent* and there has been no appar
ent tendency tor Canada to return to London on a
large scale for its capital.
4
American Investments in Canada are greater than those
in any other one country* (chart C) but figures are at best
only close estimates.

Now Canada is in the borrowing stage

of development; eventually exports must increase to repay
loans.
The best way to indicate the extent of United States
capital in Canada is to give various quotations of amount.
Charts A. B, and C are given b;r the Department of Commerce
in Handbook of AmGT»3,can underwriting of foreign securities.
Anothe r statement says:
During the three years* 1910-1913 British Investments
in Canada Increased about #775*000*000 or nearly 45
per cent. An even greater rate of increase is to be
noted in the flow of American capital into Canadian
channels. Whereas the approximate volume of United
States Investments in Canada amoimted in 1909 to
#279*000*000, the estimate for 1913 was #637*000*000.
This represents an increase of about 127 per cent
during the four years,,
5
4. Handbook of American underwriting *of foreign securities*
p. 26. 'According '•to""a"'"cohiiJiOra'fc'ioh* ^"''^6 Dominion "
Securities Corporation.
5. Theodore H. Boggs* "Capital investments and trade balances
within the Britisn Empire," The Quarterly Journal of
Economies* August* 1915.

-78In 1914, American investments in Canada had reached
an estimated total of $700,000,000 and in 1920 of
#1,300,000,00006

1922 set a new record in American invest

ments in Canada, the total of Canadian bond sales in the
7
United States being over $261,000,000*
(compare with chart
A.}

Harry Ceilings says:
It is difficult to determine the amount going
annually to Canada as bankers who underwrite such
issues have customers on both sides of the border
and business men in either country do not hesitate
to invest in the other* In 1924, Canadian Govern
ment securities, excluding refunding Issues, sold in
the United States to a value of $99,000,000 and their
corporation securities to about $85,000,000* 8 ,
Ccompare with chart B*)
'««*
V*V,
Fifty-seven per cent of the total foreign investment

In Canada or eleven per cent of Canada's national wealth
A
is American,
According to the Dominion Bureau of Statis
tics, Canadians own between 55 and 65 per cent of the
securities of all enterprises located on Canadian soil and
are repurchasing their own securities.

On the other hand,

Canadians have made investments in the United States*
According to one author, Canadian capital in the United
States amounts to $874,626,000, or more than one quarter of
6 * Keenleyside, op* c l t pp* 324 and 328,
7. E. L. Chicanot, ”0ur share in Canadian progress,” Current
History, August, 1923, pp. 817-822*
8 . Harry T* Collings, "The Foreign Investment Policy of the
United States,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Folltieal and SocXa^^^l'enc^sT
» 1926, p. 73*
9. Thoma s H* Gamma ck, ^Canadian Investments, World* a Work,
April, 1929, p. 129. Keenleyside gives 8.5 per cent for
1928.

American investments in Canada®

10

Another writer estimates

that on January 1, 1928, Canadian Investments in the United
11

States totaled $722*000*000o

There is no agreement as to the relative position of
British and American investments in Canada.

The Royal Bank

of Canada Bulletin estimates that Great Britain still holds
the lead* hut The Manchester Guardian Commercial estimates
American interests at over three times those of Great
Britain.

12

The proportion of American investments in

Canadian industry is increasing,

(charts 8 * D, and 5.)

The

Literary Digest of May 6 , 1922, said:
The Trade and Commerce Department of the Dominion has
just published an analysis showing that 34 per cent of
the capital of Canadian manufacturing establishments
Is owned by citizens of the United States, 56 per cent
by Canadians, 9 per cent by persons living in Great
Britain, and 1 per cent by residents of other countries.
13
Much of this investment has been by American or part American
companies.

Chart E gives an estimate of publicaly offered

securities to be used for non-domestic purposes.

Expansion

of American Industry in Canada through other than publicaly
offered securities has also been extensive.
10. "Canada not owned by outsiders," Literary Digest,
July 6 , 1929, p. 12. Quoted from an Ottawa correspondend"to the New York Times.
11. Keenleyside, op."cit. p .1$32.
12. Scott Nearing, ’The Beonomlc Conquest of Canada,” Nation,
April 16, 1924. p. 433
13. Literary Digest, May 6 , 1922, pp. 89-90.
See Appendix, "pp. XXV-XXVXII.

-00John L. Bittinger, Consul General in Montreal, in a
report on October 22* 1902, -gives a list of about twentyfive American industrial enterprises expanding into Canada,
He gives a similar list for 1903,
14
plete,. but Indicate the trend,

These lists are not eoss*
R. W* Bunn claimed in 1925

"®hat there were 700 branch factories fully owned by parent
companies in the United States* and at least 900 other estab
lishments that were partially or completely controlled by
15
American capital,”
The expansion is not equal in all
branches of industry as is shown by the following chart»

American Investments in Canada atthe end of 1,923
$ estimated In millions ofdollars) .
Federal* prov.Indal* municipal gov,
General industries
Railways
Forests* pulp* paper, sawmills
Mining
Public utilities
land
Banking and Insurance
Miscellaneous
Total

701
540
370
325
235
138
50
35
31
2,425

14. House Documents* 55, Cons. Sept,* So* 268* 57th Cong.,
2nd Sess.* Serial 4494, p. 115.
.House Documents, 56* Cons. Sept.* No. 438* 57th Cong.*
2nd sess.* Serial 4495, p. 293.
15. Keenleyside, op. cit., p. 330.
16*, Herbert Peis s^Export, ©f American Capital,” Foreign
Affairs* July* 1925* p* 670, Estimates are high in
comparison with others.
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Keenleyside gives a table of figures showing the
percentage of capital held in various Industriea»Industry

precentage of capital held in
U. S.
Great 1.
Canada

Electrical apparatus
Meat packing
Rubber
Patent medicines
Paint and varnish
Motor cars
Motor car accessories
Brass anc copper castings
Condensed milk
Refined petroleum
Sugar
Pulp and paper

36
57
40
12
44
39
6.5
55
48.5
46.7
67.2
68

12
0.2
2
1.8
1,5
—

0.5
0.2
8.4
4.

49
4K4
50
36
47
61
93.5
44.9
40
53.1
17.2
24.
17

There is no agreement as to the importance of tariff
regulations In infltfticing the investment of capital in Canada.
After 1897, Canada definitely followed a nationalist program
with high tariffs and imperial preference.

The Dingly Tariff

of the United States was one of the factors in bringing about
such a policy.

American capital has been investing in Canada

during the twentieth century on a large scale, due to both
tariff and general economic conditions.

A few quotations

will illustrate.
17. Keenleyside, op. cit., p. 331.
Quoted from the Times
Trade Sup piemen t »""February, 1922. Figures given by the
■literary~l)jWesC7 May 6 , 1922, pp. 89-90, and by Scott
bearing iiti The Economic Conquest of Canada,” Hat ion,
April 16, 1924, give figures agreeing very closely.' The
first adds?
Railway cars; Canada, 46 $, United. States, 31$
the second:
Agricultural implements; Canada, 58$, United
States, 31$,
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Arthur Hawkes said, "The development of coital for
manufactures in Can da is largely conditioned, if not ab
solutely governed,by tariffs.
of tariffs.”

The American is here because

He also s Id, "The hational Policy that

won for ^ir John Macdonald the General Election of 1878
produced a tariff that brought American factories to the
19
Canadian side of the border."
Increased investment began after the failure of recipro
city.

"Canadian securities first acquired volume In 1911. In

that and the following two years, $107,944,000 of Canadian
20
securities were offered to American investors.
The

„

failure of t e Heel rocity Agreement in Can da and the
pooulnr backing of the National Policy made high tariffs a
principle of Canadian policy that is lively to remain for
some time.

This encouraged expansion of American Industries

In Canada, and partially accounts for the Increased Invest
ments of 1911, 1912, and 1913.
During the war, other factors outweighed tariff. In
1930 Canada raised her tariff and Business Week said:
During 1930, 65 American manufacturers completed
negotiations for the establishment of branch plants
in Canada. Another 15 are seriously contemplating the
move. In 1929, at least he If of which was a highly
18. Arthur Hawkes, "The strength of American enterprise In
Canada," Nineteenth Century, July, 1910, p. 79.
1 9 . ibid., p. m r ~—
------20. Handbook of American underwriting of foreign securities,
p. 11.

prosperous year end thus encouraging to expansion,
only 50 American manufacturers established themselves
In the Dominion.” 52 other companies made inquiries.
n Because American industrial exonnsion In Canada
heretofore has taken place largely in time of prosperity,
it is fair to say the tariff is the orimary cause for
the present rush of manufacturers across the border. 21
Keenleyside sums up the situation:
An important aspect of the American financial in
vestments in Canada is found in the establishment in
the Dominion of branch factories of American enterpris
es . Such a factory enjoys certain very definite ad
vantages; it has free access to the Dominion market,
it nrofits by the British nreference, and it benefits
from special trade agreements such as between Canada
and Prance. The automobile and similar industries
find a further incentive in the fact that the Canadian
tariff rate on parts is less than than on complete
machines, with the result that assembling plants are
economically nrof 1.1ahle.
22.
The Busin ss -'eek of uetober 19, 1929 agrees.
’Vhile other factors as trans ortation costs, Canadian
preference for Canadian made goods , and business conditions
are important in ameri can industrial investments in Cam da,
tariffs probably play the major part.

21. "American business is accenting Mr. Bennett*s ’Strong
Invitation,*” Business eek February 11, 1931, p. 24.
22. Keenleyside, op. clt., p, SZO.

Conclusions
Tariffs, trade and financial relations are closely
connected.

The United States by its high tariff policy

caused Canada to adopt a similar attitude and both countries
have continued high tariffs since 1897o
Canada exports more to Great Britain than she Imports
and imports more from the United States than she exports.
Canada is the best customer of the United States? trade with
Canada amounting to one eight of the total international
trade of the United States*

Yet little consideration has

been given to the question of payments in relation to tariffs
Trade, In Its final analysis, is a matter of barter.

All

tariff efforts have been with a view to discourage Imports
and encourage exports.

Canada has paid for imports by ex

ports to other countries and by the Invisible imports from
A

the United States— Investments*

Investment in Canadian

industry was directly Increased by the tariff barriers of
Canada.

Ultimately such investments must be repaid.

The

present tariff policy makes payment difficult.
In most of the arguments concerning trade and tariffs,
the advantages of encouraging home production are stressed.
The advantages of imports are not given a just place. Imports
should also be encouraged.

High tariffs ultimately decrease

foreign trade (1 ) by the retaliatory tariffs of other

count ales, and ({?) orcause of the difficulty of buying ex
change on a country that is aiming to export nuch more than
it 5to orts.
In our country, due to Its extent, the nain channels
of industry have not been as seriously Injured by the tariff
system as in a S' -abler nation.
diversif 1cation of industry.

Canada has less extensive
The Canadian farriers needed

the United States raarket more t':an the United States needed
the Gan-dinn ranrlets.

In If ‘or years the mimuf ?:•cburers of

the United States have boon ’
•'•ore awaVe to the

ossihilitios

of Can-da, but now tnr? ff barriers are an established
Carrdl&n poll cy, and bra-ch factories h-ve r:-nul ted.

The

tariff policy of the kui ted States has rv»de Can ada tore of
a manufacturing councry t'-an It would have been otbervPse.
In Canada, the farmers have Uept the tariffs lower
than in the Uni tod St.r,i<■&.

The Can' <11an farmers are bettor

organized: they wnot chea^ ■•mnufnetures and the consequent
loser costs of living.

Canada is a food exporting country

and the frr’-e^s realize that tariffs an food will not help
their business and .,3 a result are against too high tariffs
on manufactures* ^
1. llarvJn, op. cif., pp. •?‘
P8-229. "The second, factor which
has t<v del to reduce Canadian tariffs is that ngriculturd
is Buffie!o'-tly Important in Canada so that the farmer is
effectively represented in parliament. The Canadian fanner
realizes that as long as he produces no re wheat than is
consumed in Canada, the Canudian price for wheat will re
flect conditions of sun. -.fy and d.-nnnd throughout the world.
.....he is unwill ing to e m i t Parliament to extend more than
a moder- te protection to Ctm dian nnnuf cturlng Inter*'at s. w

-86The United States is also a food exporting country but
the farmer believes in the possibilities of protection es
pecially against Canadian competition.

One writer said that

no where were the possibilities of Canada more fully recog
nized than by the farmers of the United States.

Free trade

.in foodstuffs would be primarily a matter of border con
venience for two exporting countries where the ultimate price
is set by world markets.
Another interesting comparison of the farmers of the
two countries is that it is during depression that the
Canadian farmers most want better trade relations with the
United States and that the American farmers want protection©
Hie United ^tates has high tariffs on all except what
she must hove from Canada*

From time to time there has been

discussion of embargoes on raw materials leaving Canada, but
the only one levied was that of the Provinces on pulp-wood.
It Is probable that the time will come when exporters
will realize that their trade depends on importing and that
some tariff reductions will result.

The opportunity to see

the effects of lower tariff in the United States was lost in
1913 due to war conditions.

2. See above, po. 16,32, 53.

The Agreement of 1911 was played up by political parties
in both countries but was not of as much economic signifi
cance as many believe it*

Canada gained by the Underwood

Tariff practically all she would have obtained by the agree
ment*

Any reductions in the tariff wall between the two

countries is more likely to come from reductions in the
general tariff regulations of each country than by a
reciprocal agreement or treaty*
Trade has increased in spite of tariff barriers.bEaeh
increase in tariff has caused a set back in trade increase•
While tariffs have not in the long rim decreased trade* they
have not allowed the increase or specialization of trade
that would have resulted from freer regulations*

I

ARTICLE 3 OP CANADIAN
RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1854
It Is agreed, that the Articles enumerated In the
Schedule hereunto annexed, being the growth and produce
of the aforesaid British Colonies or the United States,
shall he admitted into each Country respectively free of
duty:
SCHEDULE
Crain, flour, and breadstuffs of all kinds,
Animals of all kinds.
Fresh, smoked, and salted meats.
Cotton-wool, seeds and vegetables.
Undrled fruits, dried fruits,
Pish of all kinds.
Products of fish and of ell other creatures living in the
water.
Poultry, eggs.
Hides, furs, skins or tails, undressed,
Stone and marble in its crude or unwrought state,
Slate.
Butter, cheese, tallow.
Lard, horns, manures.
Ores of metals of all kinds.
Coal, '
Pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes.
Timber and lumber of all kinds, round, hewed, and sawed;
unmanufactured in whole or in part.
Firewood.
Plants, shrubs, and trees.
Pelts, wool.
FIah-oil.
Rice, broom-corn, bark.
Sypsum, groung or unground.
Hewn or wrought or unwrought burr or grindstones.
Dye-stuffs.
Unmanufactured tobacco.
Rags.
Tansill, op. cit., p. 90-91.
Reciproc1ty with Canada, p. 23.
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SPECIAL MESSAGE
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
In my annual message of December 6, 1910, I stated
that the policy of broader and closer trade relations with
the Dominion of Canada, which was initiated in the adjust
ment of the maximum and minimum provisions of the tariff
act of August 5, 1909, has proved mutually beneficial and
that it justified further efforts for the readjustment of
the commercial relations of the two countries.

I also in

formed you that, by my direction, the Secretary of State
had dispatched two representatives of the Department of
State as special commissioners to Ottawa to confer with
representatives of the Dominion Government, that they were
authorized to take steps to formulate a reciprocal trade
agreement, and that the Ottawa conferences thus begun, had
been adjourned to be resumed in Washington*
On the 7th of the present month two cabinet ministers
came to '7a shington as representatives of the Dominion
Government, and the conferences were continued between
them and the Secretary of State.

The result of the ne

gotiations was that on the 21st Instant a reciprocal trade
agreement was reached, the text of which is herewith trans
mitted with accompanying correspondence and other data.

Ill

One by one the controversies resulting from the un
certainties which attended, the partition of British ter
ritory on the American Continent at the close of the Rev
olution, and which were inevitable under the then con
ditions, have been eliminated— some by arbitration and
some by direct negotiation.

The merits of these disputes,

many of them extending through a century, need not now
be reviewed.

They related to the settlement of bound

aries, the definition of rights of navigation, the inter
pretation of treaties, and many other subjects.
Through the friendly sentiments, the energetic
efforts, and the broadly patriotic views of successive
administrations, and expeclally of that of my immediate
predecessor, all these questions have been settled.

The

most acute related to the Atlantic fisheries, and this
long-standing controversy, after amicable negotiation,
was referred to The Hague Tribunal.

The judgment of that

august international court has been accepted by the people
of both countries and a satisfactory agreement In pursuance
of the Judgment has ended completely the controversy.
equitable arrangement has recently been reached between
our Interstate Commerce Commission and the similar body
in Canada in regard to through rates on the transports-

An
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tion lines between the two countries.
•Hie path having been thus opened for the improve
ment of commercial relations, a reciprocal trade agree
ment is the logical sequence of all that has been ac
complished in disposing of matters of a diplomatic and
controversial character.

She Identity of interest of

two peoples linked together by race, language, political
institutions, and geographical proximity offers the
foundation.

The contribution of the Industrial advance

ment of our own country by the migration across the
boundary of the thrifty and industrious Canadians of
English, Scotch, and French origin is now repaid by the
movement of large numbers of our own sturdy farmers to
the northwest of Canada, thus giving their labor, their
means, and their experience to the development of that
section, with its agricultural possibilities.
Hie guiding motive in seeking adjustment of trade
relations between two countries so situated geographic
ally should be to give play to productive forces as far
as practicable, regardless of political boundaries.
i?hile equivalency should be sought in an arrangement of
this character, an exact balance of financial gain is not
imperative nor attainable.

Ho yardstick can measure the

V

benefits to the two peoples of this freer commercial
intercourse and no trade agreement should be Judged
wholly by customhouse statistics.
We hare reached a stage in our own development that
Calls for a statesmanlike and broad view of our future
economic status and its requirements.

We have drawn up

on our natural resources in such a way as to invite at
tention to their necessary limit.

This has properly a-

roused effort to conserve them, to avoid their waste, and
to restrict their use to our necessities.

We have so in

creased in population and in our consumption of food pro
ducts and the other necessities of life, hitherto sup
plied largely from our own country, that unless we mat
erially increase our production we can see before us a
change in our economic position, from that of a country
selling to the world food and natural products of the
farm and forest, to one consuming and importing them.
Excluding cotton, which is exceptional, a radical change
is already shown in our exports in the falling off in the
amount of our agricultural products sold abroad and a cor
responding marked increase in our manufactures exported.
A farsighted policy requires that if we can enlarge our
supply of natural resources, and especially of Sood pro-
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ducts and the necessities of life, without substantial
Injury to any of our producing and manufacturing classes ,
we should take steps to do so not?*

V® hare on the north

of us a country contiguous to ours for three thousand
miles, with natural resources of the sane character as
ours which have not been drawn upon as ours have been,
and 3n the development of which the conditions as to
wages and character of the wage earner and transportation
to market differ but little from those prevailing with
us.

l‘h© difference is not greater than It is between

different States of our own country or between different
Provinces of the Dominion of Canada*

Ought we not, then,

to arrange a commercial agreement with Canada, if we can,
by which we shall hove direct access to her great supply
of natural products without an obstructing or prohibitory
tariff?

M s

is not a violation of the protective prin

ciple, as that has been authoritatively announced by
those who uphold It, because? that principle does not call
for a tariff between this country and one whose con
ditions as to production, population, and wages are so
like ours, and when our common boundary line of three
thousand miles In itself must make a radical distinction
between our commercial treatment of Canada and of any
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other country*
The Dominion has greatly prospered.

It has an

actire, aggressive, and intelligent people.
coming to the parting of the ways.

They are

They must soon de

cide whether they are to regard themselves as isolated
permanently from our markets by a perpetual wall or
whether we are to be commercial friends*
them reason to

If we give

take the former view, can we complain

if they adopt methods denying access co certain of their
natural resources except upon conditions quite unfavor- '
able to us?

A notable instance of such a possibility

may be seen in the conditions surrounding the supply of
pulp wood and the manufacture of print paper, for which
we have made a conditional provision in the agreement,
believed to be equitable.

Should we not now, therefore,

before their policy has become too crystallized and fix
ed for change, meet them in a spirit of real concession,
facilitate commerce between the two countries, and thus
greatly increase the natural resources available to our
people?
I do not wish to hold out the prospect that the un
restricted interchange of food products will greatly and
at once reduce their cost to the people of this country*
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Moreover, the present small amount of Canadian surplus
for export as compared with that of our own production
and consumption would make the reduction gradual.

Ex

cluding the element of transportation, the price of
staple food products, expeclally of cereals, Is much the
same the world over, and the recent increase in price has
"been the result of a world-wide cause.

But a source of

supply as near as Canada would certainly help to prevent
speculative fluctuations, would steady local price move
ments, and would postpone the effect of a further world
increase in the price of leading commodities entering in
to the cost of living, if that be inevitable.
In the reciprocal trade agreement numerous additions
are made to the free list.

These Include not only food

commodities, such as cattle, fish, wheat and other grains,
fresh vegetables, fruits, and dairy products, but also
rough lumber and raw materials useful to our own indus
tries.

Free lumber we ought to have.

By giving our

people access to Canadian forests we shall reduce the
consumption of our own, which, in the hands of compar
atively few owners, now have a value that requires the
enlargement of our available timber resources.
Natural, and expeclally

food, products being placed
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on the free list, the logical development of a policy
of reciprocity In rates on secondary food products, or
foodstuffs partly manufactured, is, where they cannot
also b© entirely exempted from duty* to lower the duties
in accord with the exemption of the raw material from
duty*

This has been followed in the trade agreement

which has been negotiated*

As an example, wheat Is made

free and the rate on flour is equalized on a lower basis*
In the same way, live animals being made free, the duties
on fresh meats and oh secondary meat products and on can
ned meats are substantially lowered*

Fresh fruits and

vegetables being placed on the free list, the duties on
canned goods of these classes are reduced*
Both countries in their industrial development have
to meet the competition of lower priced labor in other
parts of the world.

Both follow the policy of encourag

ing the development of home industries by protective
duties within reasonable limits.

This has made it dif

ficult to extend the principle of reciprocal rates to
many manufactured commodities, but after much negotiation
and effort we have succeeded in doing so in various and
important instances.
The benefit to our widespread agricultural imple-
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meat Industry from the reduction of Canadian duties in
the agreement is clear...

Reciprocity with Canada must necessarily be chiefly
confined in its effect on the cost of living to food and
forest products,

1'he question of the cost of clothing

as affected by duty on textiles and their raw materials,,
so much mooted;, Is not within the scope of an agreement
with Canada, becuase she raises comparatively few wool
sheep, and her textile manufactures are unimportant.

She has cost un nothing in the way of preparations
for defense against her possible assault, and she never
will.

She has sought to agree with us quickly when dif

ferences have disturbed our relations*
us common traditions and aspirations»

She shares with
I feel I have cor

rectly interpreted the wish of the American people by ex
pressing in the arrangement now submitted to Congress for
its approval, their desire for a more intimate and cordial
relationship with Canada.

I therefore earnestly hope that

the measure will be promptly enacted into law,
Wm. H. Taft*
The White House, January 26, 1911.
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LETTER FROM TEE CANADIAN MINISTERS TO
THE SECRETARY OP STATE
Washington, January 21st, 1911.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
1. The negotiations Initiated by the President sev
eral months ago, through your communication to His
Excellency the British Ambassador, respecting a reciprocal
tariff arrangement between the United States and Canada,
and since carried on directly between representatives of
the Governments of the two countries, have now, we are
happy to say, reached a stage which gives reasonable as
surance of a conclusion satisfactory to both countries.
2 . We desire to set forth what we understand to

be

the contemplated arrangement and to ask you to confirm it.
5.

It is agreed that the desired tariff changes shall

not take the formal shape of a treaty, but that the Govern
ments of the two countries will use their utmost efforts to
bring about such changes by concurrent legislation at Wash
ington and Ottawa.
4.

The Governments of the two countries having mad©

this agreement from the conviction that, if confirmed by
the necessary legislative authorities, it will benefit the
people on both sides of the border line, we may reasonably
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hope and expect; that the arrangement, If so confirmed,
will remain In operation for a considerable period.

Only

this expectation on the part of both Governments would
Justify the time and labour that have been employed in the
maturing of the proposed measures.

Nevertheless, it is

distinctly understood that we do not attempt to bind for
the future the action of the United States Congress or the
Parliament of Canada, but that each of these authorities
shall be absolutely free to make any change of tariff pol
icy or of any other matter covered by the present arrange
ment that may be deemed expedient.

VJe look for the con

tinuance of the arrangement, not because either party is
bound to it, but because of our conviction that the more
liberal trade policy thus to be established will be view
ed by the people of the United States and Canada as one
which will strengthen the friendly relations now happily
prevailing and promote the commercial interests of both
countries.
S.

As respects a considerable list of articles pro

duced In both countries, we have been able to agree that
they shall be reciprocally free.

A list of the articles

to be admitted free of duty into the United States when
Imported from Canada, and into Canada when Inported from
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the United States,, is set forth in Schedule A.
6 * As respects another group of articles,, we have
been able to agree upon common rates of duty to be
applied to such articles when imported into the United
• }

States from Canada or Into Canada from the United States*
A list of these articles, with the rates of duty, is set
forth in Schedule B*
7. In a few instances It has been found that the
adoption of a common rate will be Inconvenient and there
fore exceptions have to be made*
8 . Schedule 0 specified articles upon which the
United States will levy the rates therein set forth when
such articles are imported from Canada*
9* Schedule D specifies articles upon which Canada
will levy the rates therin set forth when such articles
are imported from the United States *
10. With respect to the discussions that have taken
place concerning the duties upon the several grades of pulp,
printing paper, etc,— mechanically ground wood pulp, chemi
cal wood pulp, bleached and unbleached, news printing paper
and other printing paper and board made from wood pulp, of
the value not exceeding four cents per pound at the place
of shipment— we note that you desire to provide that such
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articles from Canada shall be made free of duty in the
United States only upon certain conditions respecting the
shipment of pulp wood from Canada*

It is necessary that

we should point out that this is a matter in which we are
not in a position to make any agreement.

The restrictions

at present existing In Canada are of a Provincial character*
They have been adopted by several of the Provinces with re
gard to what are believed to be Provincial interests,

f/e

have neither the right nor the desire to interfere with
the Provincial authorities In the free exercise of their
constitutional powers in the administration of their public
lands*

The provisions you are proposing to make respect

ing the conditions upon which these classes of pulp and
paper may be Imported Into the United States free of duty
must necessarily

be for the present inoperative.

Whether

the Provincial Governments will desire to in any way mod
ify their regulations with a view to securing the free ad
mission of pulp and paper from their Provinces into the
market of the United States must be a question for the
Provincial authorities to decide.

In the meantime? the

present duties on pulp and paper Imported from the United
States into Canada will remain.

Whenever pulp and paper

of the classes already mentioned are admitted into the
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United States free of duty from all parts of Canada, then
similar articles, when imported from the United States,
shall he admitted Into Canada free of duty*
11* 2?he. tariff changes proposed might not alone be
sufficient to fully bring about the more favourable con
ditions which both parties desire*

It is conceivable that

Customs regulations which are deemed essential in some
cases might operate unfavourably upon the trade between
the United States and Canada and that such regulations, if
made without due regard to

the special conditions of the

two countries, might to some extent defeat and good purpose
of the present arrangement*

It is agreed that the utmost

care shall be taken by both Governments to see that only
such Customs regulations are adopted as are reasonably
necessary for the protection of the treasury against fraud
that no regulation shall be made or maintained which un
reasonably hampers the more liberal exchange of commodities
now proposed; that representations on either side as to
the unfavourable operation of any regulation will receive
from the other all due consideration, with the earnest
purpose of removing any just cause of complaint; and that,
if any further legislation is found necessary to enable
either Government to carry out the purpose of this pro-
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vision, such legislation will he sought from Congress or
Parliament as the case may he*
12. The Government of Canada agree that, until other
wise determined by them, the licenses hitherto Issued to
United States fishing vessels under the provisions of
Section 3 of Chapter 47 of the Revised Statutes of Canada,
granting to such vessels certain privileges on the Atlantic
coast of Canada shall continue to he Issued and that the
fee to he paid to the Government of Canada for such license
by the owner or commander of any such United States vessel
shall hereafter be one dollar per annum.
13. It is understood that upon a day and hour to be
agreed upon between the two Governments the President of
the United States will communicate to Congress the con
clusions now reached and recommend the adoption of such
•

legislation as may be necessary on the part of the United
States to give effect to the proposed arrangement.
14. It is understood that simultaneously with the
sending of such communication to the United States Con
gress by

the President, the Canadian Government will com

municate to the Parliament of Canada the conclusions now
reached and will thereupon take the necessary steps to pro
cure such legislation as is required to give effect to the
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proposed arrangement.
15.

Such legislation on the part of the United

States may contain a provision that it shall not come in
to operation tint11 the United States Government are assur
ed the corresponding legislation has

been or will be

passed by the Parliament of Canada| and In like manner the
legislation on the part of Canada may contain a provision
that it shall not come into operation until the Government
of Canada are assured that corresponding legislation has
been passed or will be passed by the Congress of the United
States 6
Yours faithfully*
W. S. Fielding.
Wm. Paterson.
The Honorable P. C* Knox*
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
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REPLY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
Washington, January 21, 1911.
The Honorable W. s* Fielding and
The Honorable William Paterson,
Washington.
Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the re
ceipt of your communication of this date in relation to
the negotiations Initiated by the President several
months ago for a reciprocal trade arrangement between the
United States and Canada, in which you set forth and ask
me to confirm your understanding of the results of our
recent conferences in continuation of these negotiations.
I take great pleasure In replying that your state
ment of the proposed arrangement is entirely in accord
with my understanding of it. ‘
It is a matter of some regret on our part that we
have been unable to

adjust our differences on the subject

of wood pulp, pulp wood and print paper.

We recognize the

difficulties to which you refer growing out of the nature
of the relation between the Dominion and Provincial Govern
ments, and for the present we must be content with the con
ditional arrangement which has been proposed in Schedule A
attached to your letter.

XIX

I fully appreciate the importance, to which you cell
attention, of not permitting a too regid customs administra
tion to interfere with the successful operation of our
agreement, If It Is approved by the Congress of the United
States and the Parliament of ^anada, and X desire to con
firm your statement of our understanding on this point*

I

am satisfied that the spirit evinced on both sides gives
assurance that every effort will he made to secure the full
measure of benefit which is contemplated In entering into
this arrangement*
The assurance that you give that the Dominion Govern
ment proposed to require only a nominal fee from the fish
ing vessels of the United States for the privileges In
Canadian waters for which heretofore a charge of $1.50 per
ton for each vessel has been required is most gratifying*
I heartily concur in your statement of the purposes
inspiring the negotiations and in the views expressed by
you as to the mutual benefits to be derived by both coun
tries in the event our work is confirmed, and I take this
opportunity to assure you, on behalf of the President, of
his appreciation of the cordial spirit In which you have
met us in these negotiations*
I have the honor to be. Gentlemen, your obedient

*•
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servant s
Fa G» Knox.
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ACI®0vILEDGMBBT OP TOE CANADIAN JJINIS'TEKS.
Washington, D* C., .January Slat, 1911*
Dear Mr* secretary:

We have received with much sat

isfaction your letter of this date in which you have eonfinned our understanding of the arrangement which is being
made between us respecting trade relations between the
United States and Canada*
In bringing the negotiations to a close permit us to
express our warmest appreciation of the spirit' in which the
whole subject has been dealt with by the President and your
self and of the unvarying courtesy which we have received
in Washington from all the officials of your Government
with whom we have been brought in contact.
Tours faithfully,
w. S* Fielding*
Wm. Paterson*
The Honourable P* C# Knox,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. 0*
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Commodity

Old Hat©
Underwood Tariff

Wheat
Wheat flour and Semlnola
Flaxseed
Corn
Beans, not specially
provided for
Potatoes
Onions
Cattle
Sheep
Fresh or frozen beef,
veal, mutton, lamb
and pork
Meat not specially
provided for
Wool:
Unwashed
Washed
Scoured
Woolen Manufactures
Butter & substitutes
Cheese & substitutes
Fresh Milk
Cream
Condensed, milk
Sugar of milk
Wrapper tobacco:
if unstemmed
if stemmed
Apples
Cherries

Hew Hat©
Emergency Tariff

Free
Free
20$ per bus*
Free

35$
20$
30$
15$

25$ per bus
Free
20$ per bus*
10$ ad val,
10$ ad val.

24 per bus.
25$ per bus.
40$ per bus.
30$ ad val.
$>1~$52 per head

per bus.
ad val.
per bus.
per bus.

Free

2$ per lb.

Free

25$ ad val.

Free
Free
Free
Various
2*|$ Per lb.
20$ ad val.
Free
Free
Free
Free

15$
30$
45$
45$
6$
23$

$1*85 per lb.
$52.50 per lb.
10$ per bus.
10$ per bus.,
1$ a lb. or
free

$2.35 per lb.
$3.00 per lb.
30$ per bus.
3$ per lb*

per lb.
per lb.
per lb.
per lb. a&<
per lb.
ad val.
24 per gal.
5$ per gal.
3$ per gal.
5$ per lb.

Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921, ed by
y«'‘''Oaslefi''Hopkins, {Toronto,
V ’pV’'
For complete schedules see Dictionary of Tariff Information,
United States Tariff Commission* "Iwashington,,1 D 7 C .p 1^4')"' "

XXIII

Row Tariff
Cattle
Sheep
Hogs
Hi Ik, fresh
Milk, condensed .
.Cheese
.Batter
Sggs
Horses
meat'
Flour '
Oats
Barley
Corn
-Corameal
Rye
Apples
Wool
Potatoes
1%
Fresh lamb
Fresh Pork
Bacon, hams
hogs
Purs
Fish

1| to 2/ ib
is a head
m lh
2$/ lb
lii lb
5/ ib
8/ lb
8/ doz
aaosfi
30/ bush
*78/ cwt
15/ bush
80/ bush
15/ bush
30/ o»t
15/ bush
25/ bush
31/ lb
50/ cwt
$4 t o n ,
4/ lb*
1/ lb*
2/ 1b*$1 per M
25#
2/ lb.

1913 Tariff
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
20
2-i/
Free
10#
FreeFree
6/
15/
Free
Free
Free
10/
Free
Free
#2 ton
Free
Free
Free
Pre©
30#
Free

Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1922, pi 94*
a^e'^Mellonayingf' f^rllr Informatione
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Chart iU
Geographical Distribution of Foreign
Capital Issues Publicly Offered, in the United States

Canada

Tear
Nominal
Capital
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

Estimated
Refunding

Net Nominal
Capital

$13,419,000
163,340,272
163,551,464
222,525,200
18,640,000
202,155,000
189,378,106
196,571,914
226,842,384
142,956,600
277,354,187
264,992,750
308,790,800
312,346,395
237,365,800
308,730,300

87.300.000
5.500.000
3.050.000
58.550.000
23,000,000
125.735.000
127.875.000
82,488,500
75.965.000
52.365.000
19,056,875

#13,419,000
155,740,272
161.801,464
212,175,200
16,640,000
114,855,000
183,878,106
193,521,914
168,292,384
119,956,600
151,619,187
137,117,750
226,302,300
236,381,395
184,865,800
289,695,425

3,248,960,172

682,700,375

2,566,259,797

#7,600,000
1.750.000
10.350.000

2 ,000,000

Handbook on American Underwriting of Foreign Securities.
United States department; of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce. Trade Promotion Series, Ho. 104.
(Washington, D. C., 1930) p. 19.
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Chart Bo
let Hominal Capital Obtained Through Government
and Corporate Capital Issues of Canada, Publicly Offered
in the United States

Tear
Total

1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

Canada
Government and
government guaran
teed or controlled
. issues

$13,419,000
155,740,272
161,801,464
212,175,200
16,640,000
114,855,000
. 183,878,106
193,521,914
168,292,384
119,956,600
151,619,187
137,117,750
226,302,300
236,381,395
184,865,800
289,693.425

. $5,644,000
126,242,272
,139,149,464
173,438,200
11,995,000
93,965,000
139,828,106
.124,006,914
.130,435,884
81,300,000
.110,629,187
64,818,500
. 64,427,800
121,961,250
72,026,500
141,223,725

2,566,259,797

1,601,091,802

Corporate

$7,775,000 .
29,498,000
22,652,000
38,737,000
4,645,000
20,890,000
44,050,000
69,515,000
37,856,500
38,656,600
40,990,000
72,299,250
161,874,500
114,420,145
112,839,300
148,469,700
965,167,295

Handbook on American Underwriting of Foreign Securities. p. 21
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Chart Co
Percentage Distribution, by Geographic Areas,
of the let Nominal Capital Obtained Through Foreign
Capital Issues Publicly Offered In the United States.

Year

1914
1915
1916
191V
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

Europe

percent
25.0
.74#5
72.4
57.9
58.2
49.7
25.1
27.7
25.7
54,3
58.5
43.0
43.2
47.8
21.1

Canada

percent
30,5
19.4
14.0
31.0
79.8
29.3
37.0
31.0
22.0
28.5
15.7
12.7
20.1
17.7
14.8
43.1

Latin
America
percent
39*3
5.8
12.5
10,4
11.0
8.6
9.9
36.8
29.3
27.2
19.3
14.7
32.7
26.4
26.4
26.1

Far East

percent'
0.7
.2
.2
2.5
14.7
16.8
9.9
13.2
2,8
11.3
10.5
7.7

American
territories
& possessions
percent
5.2
• .1
.4
.5
9.2
3.7
3.4
4.6
6.3
1.8
.8
.9
1.4
2,4
.5
2.0

Handbook on American Underwriting of Foreign Securities
p 2o .
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Chart Do
Capital Issues of Canada Publicly Offered la the
United States (In thousands of dollars)

Tear
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
Total
Grand Total

Government

Corporate

5*644
126*242
139*149
175*188
12*995
173*965
139,828
124*006
186,935
100*800
226*629
182*593
120,227
166*461
72*026
159,710

7.775
37,098
24*402
47*337
5,645
28,190
49,550
72*565
39,906
42,156
50,725
82*399
188,563
145*885
165 *339
149*019

2*122*398 (1)

1,136*534 (2)

3,248,952 (3)

(1) Newfoundland (|26,535) included*
(2) Newfoundland (§5*926) included*
C3) Newfoundland (§32*461) included*

Handbook on American Underwriting of Foreign Securities*
p . 27
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Chart Eo
Set Nominal Value of Publicly Offered Capital
Issues of American and Seal-American Corporations for
Nondomestic Purposes*

Year
1915
1916
1917 .
OU18
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
Total

Canada
$4*849*000
2*125*000
12,372,000
4,000*000
7,500*000
21,150*000
7*500,000
500,000
6,725,000
36,587,750
47*250,000
57,174,000
28,410*600
69*309,200
305,452,550

Handbook on American Underwriting of foreign Securities*
p. 23
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